

From Protests to Policy:

How the Institutionalization of Indigenous Movements Affects Environmental Policy Related to Resource Extraction In Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia

By
Karl VonZabern

Senior Honors Thesis
Department of Political Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
March 22, 2018

Approved:

Evelyn Huber, Thesis Advisor

Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, Reader

Candis Smith, Reader

Acknowledgements

I would like to thanks Professor Huber for her expertise, feedback, and support through this process.

I would also like to thank Professor Schoultz for helping me apply to the Burch Fellowship for the summer of 2016 which inspired this project.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	3
Literature review.....	5
Theory and Hypotheses.....	14
Methodology.....	15
Case Selection Criteria.....	16
La Oroya in Peru.....	22
Litigation against Texaco in Ecuador	32
TIPNIS Road Project in Bolivia.....	45
Analysis and Conclusion.....	62

Introduction:

There is overwhelming evidence that indigenous communities in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia face a disproportionate amount of environmental degradation from extractive industries compared to their counterparts that identify as mestizo or white. Environmental protection and territorial autonomy are fundamental tenants of most indigenous political organization in rural regions with an acute environmental impact from extractive practices. Indigeneity is linked intrinsically to territory, but environmental degradation in indigenous territories is more than just a land issue. Pollution from extractive industries is extremely detrimental to the public health of indigenous communities across the Andes. High rates of environmental degradation on indigenous land is surprising given the fact that a substantial portion of the population identifies as indigenous and because of the growing environmental consciousness across international communities since the 1970s. Intuitively, one would expect that indigenous people would have more political power in the national political arena purely because they make up a large portion of the electorate. This intuition proves to be false for a variety of historical legacies that have undermined and repressed indigenous groups.

Air and water degradation from resource extraction is extremely consequential for local communities. The negative effects of concentrated extraction, however, are less apparent and less urgent for policy makers in the international community. Indigenous environmentalism must be distinguished from a global environmentalism because transboundary pollution such as deforestation and climate change have different set of problems from concentrated pollution from resource extraction. The distinction between local and global environmentalism is salient because the power dynamic between the two scenarios are so different. The political forces involved in local resource extraction are asymmetrical compared global environmental

movements. Global environmental movements benefit from and rely on international pressures to move policy whereas localized environmental movements have to work within their respective national framework. Although international politics is intertwined in the cases discussed in this thesis, the domestic political structure and quality of institutions take precedence over international actors.

The goal of this thesis is to analyze why have indigenous environmental movements in countries with such a high population of indigenous people continued to fail? It looks at how indigenous social movements in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, became part of the formal political institutions given varying antecedent conditions such as mobilization of on the basis of ethnicity and the desire for organizations to institutionalize. It traces how those movements tried to create and enforce environmental policy, and why there is still no long term environmental policy protecting indigenous peoples in these countries. It utilizes case studies from each of these three countries and a multilevel theory of political analysis to determine the forces responsible for fluctuations in environmental outcomes. This thesis argues that government dependence on certain extractive industries creates a serious barrier for indigenous political movements who seek alliances with the left leaning parties. By tracing the roots of indigenous political organization from social movement to political parties, this thesis then evaluates the impact the newfound political institutions have had on the three chosen cases of environmental degradation. The cases of La Oroya in Peru, the Oriente region in Ecuador, and the case of TIPNIS road project in Bolivia demonstrate the importance and limitations of political mobilization based on indigenous identity.

Literature Review:

The literature on social movement categorization, formation, and effectiveness spans a wide variety of disciplines. In order to situate these specific social movements within the literature, it is first important to understand where social movement literature began and where it is now. This paper seeks to understand why some movements effectively mobilize popular discontent that results in effective environmental policy and social movement efficacy changes after they come to participate in formal political institutions. Any conversation on the successes and failures of movements cannot exclude the underlying political structures under which a given movement operates and, in some cases, joins. The goal of this literature review is to contextualize general social movement research and apply it to indigenous environmental movements in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia.

Social movement literature begins by categorizing movements in fairly general terms. Social movements are categorized by the nature and extent to which they desire change. There are reform movements, revolutionary movements, reactionary movements, self-help movements, and religious movements. Each style of movement seeks political change by mobilizing widespread discontent due to both absolute and relative deprivation, most often within some kind of group identity. Reform movements work within the current political framework of a given system of governance in order to improve conditions. The cases in this project fall within the categorization of reform movements. Reform movements sit in stark contrast to revolutionary movements which have the much more ambitious goal of usurping an entire government in order to meet their objectives. Reactionary movements respond to recent political change in hopes that the recent change will be overturned. Next, religious movements are organized based around an underlying religious belief or worldview. Religious movement theory may be utilized in this

paper because of the potential overlap between religious and ethnic identities of indigenous groups that help facilitate political activity, but will ultimately take a subsidiary role.

Social movement theory also spends a great deal of time on why some cases of widespread discontent result in political activism while other cases do not. James C. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (1970) posit that one group's relative deprivation of some need is more important to the formation of social movements than absolute deprivation. That is to say that social discontent only materializes in action when there is a noticeable difference in the standings between distinct groups. Relative deprivation can apply to material, political, social inequities. Snow and Oliver (1995) later contended that relative deprivation is a necessary but insufficient condition for the formation of social movements. Relative deprivation must be present but it does not tell the full story.

Again, most of the research contributing to social movement theory focuses on the formation of social movements to begin with and then traces their successes and failures to the inherent characteristics of the movements themselves. One avenue that social movement scholars have pointed to as being a central condition of social movement success is the way that social movements create social networks and recruit members. David S. Meyer observed "[T]he best predictor of why anyone takes on any political action is whether that person has been asked to do so. Issues do not automatically drive people into the streets," (Meyer, 2007). This idea is useful when analyzing the social infrastructure that movements rely on. Although demographic and communication capabilities might be similar, the way those resources are utilized can account for large discrepancies in a movement's effectiveness.

Another idea put forth by McCarthy and Zald (1977) is Resource Mobilization Theory. This theory argues that social movements are a rational response by social movement leaders.

Under this theory, the most salient factor for social movements to meet their political goals is the way that social movement leaders mobilize resources such as time, money, and energy of the population. Critics have argued that Resource Mobilization Theory overestimates the importance of leadership and underestimates how powerful emotions are in social movements. Movements can be portrayed in this frameworks as cold and unemotional when in reality nearly every social movement relies on emotions substantially. Participants of social movements are also known to react in substantive ways when conditions worsen. Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, in their book *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (2004), argue that social movements are most effective when leaders maintain a level of emotional energy but make decisions in a purely rational way. Resource Mobilization Theory is one of the more prominent theories in the field and explains important aspects of social movement's consequentiality, but does not consider the political circumstances, demographic characteristics, economic conditions, or historical grievances that explain certain outcome.

In contrast, Political Opportunity Theory posits that social movements are more likely to arise and succeed when political opportunities emerge. One such opportunity is when a previously repressive regime transitions to democracy (Snow and Soule, 2010). This theory is supported by the fact that social movements are much more common in democracies or when quality of democracy improves. It is useful to frame this research project in Political Opportunity Theory because one such measure of the quality of democracy is pluralism within a political regime. Pluralism is a state or society in which members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups maintain and develop their traditional culture in the framework of a democracy. The improvement of the quality of democracy through pluralism can be achieve through rules

regarding party formation, redistricting or an improvement in descriptive representation among government officials.

Raúl Mardrid and Matthew Rodes-Purdy (2016) compared descriptive representation among women and indigenous communities in Latin America to see if and how descriptive representation affects regime support. They found that descriptive representation based on indigenous self-identification in Latin America boosts regime support among indigenous groups whereas descriptive representation among women yield more ambiguous results. Indigenous identification is more likely to shape political attitudes like class, education, and region. Furthermore, they argue that descriptive representation has been correlated to higher voter turnout, institutional legitimacy and external efficacy. This paper will look to see how pluralism through varying levels of indigenous institutionalization as a potential improvement for the quality of democracy and therefore may result in higher levels of environmental protection for localized indigenous communities. It is useful to analyze indigenous institutionalization and plurinational governance in relation to Political Opportunity Theory because it can potentially explain certain aspects of social movement efficacy.

Another important consideration is the role of the infamous “Resource Curse” which contends that a country’s ability to develop economically is stunted by an abundance of a natural resources (Black, Hashimzade, and Myles, 2017). Although economic theory is tangentially related to social movement theory, they are in fact connected by their explanatory mechanism: quality of democracy. That is to say, countries with industries that make up a dominant part of a government’s revenue are more likely to favor policies that support that industry. Overt corruption and government dependence on a single resource can diminish the quality of

democracy and prohibit social movement success because the governments are more susceptible to corruption with one dominant industry.

Another explanation for why certain movements are more successful than others is found in the literature describing the life cycles of social movements. All social movements follow a cycle in which they emerge, coalesce, bureaucratize and decline. The bureaucratization or institutionalization stage is an extremely critical time for meeting the initial demands of social movements within a reform movement. A movement could fail to bureaucratize or “they may well reduce their effectiveness by turning from disruptive activities that succeed in the movement’s earlier stages to more conventional activity by working within the system instead of outside it.” (Piven and Cloward, 1966) The movement may well be achieving its goal through the bureaucratization stage but also may be sacrificing some essential elements of the original movement to be seen as acceptable within the regime in which it operates. After bureaucratization, a movement will either decline because it has achieved its goals or because it has failed. Lack of money, loss of enthusiasm, factionalism, or the government may co-opt the movement by meeting small concessions.

The second goal of this literature review is to characterize the nature of transnational pressures for environmental accountability and activism Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. These transnational pressures range from environmental resolutions designed by international institutions or through loan conditionality from international trade agreements. It seeks not to give a comprehensive history of international environmental law but rather describe the international environmental framework as it is operating from 1990 to the present.

Environmental degradation is intrinsically connected to market failures. Normally described as a negative externality, environmental degradation is a factor that markets do not

consider. Partisanship debate is over what people consider the state's role in correcting for market failures. Although the basic framework in which governments correct for externalities is straight forward, transboundary pollution from international actors complicates the question of who is responsible to the environment. International environmental agreements focus on transboundary pollution such as ozone depletion, climate change and marine pollution with varying levels of success. The Montreal protocol is the posterchild for international agreements which successfully restricted the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) which deplete the ozone (Park and Allaby, 2013). Other environmental negotiations have gone on for years, such as the UN conferences on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro and Kyoto. The vast majority of international agreements have vague targets or a small number of signatories because of the bargaining structure of each circumstance and the collective action required to address particular issues (Ioannidis, Papandreou and Sartzakis, 2015). Climate change negotiations demonstrate how difficult it is to parse through who is responsible for what damage, and who is going to incur the cost of reducing greenhouse emissions.

Nearly all of these agreements utilize international pressure to address transboundary environmental harm. Pollution constrained to the borders of one country but caused by transnational industry creates a new set of challenges. Governments are put in a precarious position where their political success relies heavily on overall economic improvements that rely on major industries. These industries in Latin America tend to be mineral, energy or agricultural exports that make up a significant part of the countries' GDP. One way to reduce costs is to look the other way when the environment is degraded. In the context of Latin America, both economic inequality as well as environmental degradation have largely been blamed on the

physical and political infrastructure created by colonial exploitation. It has now been maintained by neoliberal policies introduced by international institutions.

This argument is best articulated in *Open Veins in Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent* by Eduardo Galeano (1971). Galeano argues that the roots of poverty in Latin America can be traced to a colonial system designed to extract resources. He describes a “contemporary system of plunder” in which modern foreign direct investment has its roots in, and resembles colonial exploitation. Many of today’s readers may see champions of Galeano’s ideology as misguided ideologues, dedicated to a set of principles that have failed to maintain economic growth. These ideologues argue that capitalism is directly responsible for much of the inequality and relative deprivation in Latin America. There has been a wave of leadership in Latin America that includes Hugo Chavez, Nicholas Maduro and Evo Morales that use this argument. They have all had a clear anti-colonial, anti-U.S. message and, in the case of Venezuela, has led to economic crisis. Galeano’s argument is not simply a critique of the material structures of exploitation but also a nuanced look at the costs and benefits of the dominant contemporary economic ideology of open markets and investment.

This argument remains dominant particularly in the context of international economic pressures. Latin American governments are expected to “set their house in order.” Robert Timmons and Nikki Demetria (2003) present an ecology of environmental crises, as well as the surrounding social and political implications in Latin America. The authors argue that the demands of environmentalism and of economic development imposed from outside are contradictory. One such example is International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality that requires governments to meet their debt obligations by encouraging friendlier policies to multilateral corporation without increasing health and safety standards. This also often leads to

the exploitation of various natural resources because much of Latin America has a comparative advantage in raw materials. Additionally, they argue that the most successful environmental movements in Latin America are those that directly affect advanced industrial countries such as deforestation. This again reaffirms an unequal power dynamic among governments in which international forces only advocate for the environment when it meets their self-interest. In addition to covering the first and second green revolution with the introduction of GM crops, and issues associated with the amazon, it also discusses how health and environmental issues are related. This information demonstrates well a power dynamic between Latin American nations and the U.S.

A comprehensive review of environmental activism is indispensable for this research because there are a particular set of political forces both internationally and domestically that follow patterns in the environmental realm. Industries that produce transnational pollution that contaminates water systems and contributes to global warming are more likely to have the international environmental forces advocate for higher environmental standards for indigenous communities.

Theory and Hypotheses:

Defining and specifying environmental outcomes in this project proved to be challenging due to the ambiguous nature of the political and physical realities of different indigenous groups. Although outcomes in this project are impossible to measure quantitatively due to the lack of a comprehensive data set and the ambiguous nature of what qualifies as successful policy, the outcomes in this project are measured by the creation and enforcement of environmental policy as a result of organized indigenous mobilization. The most successful outcomes for indigenous mobilization is momentary environmental protection and remediation resulting from indigenous movements. Temporary success is the best case scenario in the universe of cases which presents mostly negative outcomes. The goal of this project is to analyze indigenous environmental movements in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia to make a qualitative analysis to test 5 theoretical arguments regarding indigenous social movements.

(1) The first hypothesis is that mobilization on behalf of indigenous identity is more likely to yield positive environmental results. Ethnic and cultural mobilization is based around a common identity, with tangible features and clear boundaries of who falls into what socially constructed category. Indigeneity is a dichotomous identifier that creates a well-defined in-group and out-group. Consistent organization is more likely when there is a well-established group identity resulting in a more unified political force that will address issues like environmental degradation more effectively. Mobilization based on indigenous identity is distinct from indigenous identity itself. It is possible that people identify as indigenous without putting their indigenous identity at the center of their political engagement.

(2) Indigenous social movements become more moderate when they institutionalize. Movements are more likely to compromise on some of their initial policy objectives after they

become part of a formal political parties with the capacity to make policy decisions. Social movements become more moderate once they gain political power in democracies largely as a result of the democratic process. Social movement leaders are no longer only concerned with obtaining their policy objectives, but are now concerned with maintaining their political power through democratic means. Social movement leaders must move away from more of the radical aspects of their original policy goals to appeal to a broader constituency.

(3) Social movements are more effective at blocking policy than they are at creating policy. The baseline indicator of social movement power is the number of people who actively contribute to social movement activities like protests, boycotts, or marches. These activities are more disruptive, difficult to ignore and/or suppress when more supporters participate. It is easier to mobilize people who disagree with a policy than those who agree with policy for two main reasons. First, it is easier to muster a group of people based on the premise that something they already possess and use is threatened. In the framework of this project, an example is when air and water resources are put at risk and widespread protests shut down cities. Second, a threat to something people already have inspires a more visceral emotional response than imagining a policy that would create a new resource.

(4) Coalition building between indigenous movements and political parties on the left creates inherent conflicts of interest. The political preferences of the left have historically taken precedence over indigenous groups in Latin America. If a political alliance between the left and an indigenous group faces a policy decision in which it must choose between helping the left and helping indigenous peoples, it will choose helping the left. This is because constituents on the left in urban locales are more able to mobilization in a disruptive manner due to physical geography. Also, people are more likely to have strong emotional responses to losing social

welfare protections. The last reason for this hypothesis is that indigenous parties are unified along ethnic lines instead of an ideological commonalities with well-defined policy preferences at the national level.

(5) The diversity of indigenous interests is revealed once indigenous parties gain national power. Indigenous identity is not defined by a clearly defined worldview that prefers particular policy outcomes. Indigenous people are defined only by their nativity to a particular place and their implicit right to that place.¹ The maintenance of territorial rights, then, is at the heart of indigenous politics. The whole premise of indigeneity loses its unifying quality when territorial rights are no longer challenged, and indigenous people must decide what to do with their land.

¹ Maybury-Lewis, D. (2005, Spring). DEFINING INDIGENOUS. *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, 29, 11. Retrieved from <http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/197456097?accountid=14244>

Methodology:

One can only address the question of how the institutionalization of indigenous movements affects environmental outcomes for the selected cases in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia through qualitative methods. There are no data that include all of the cases of environmental degradation for these three countries, nor is it possible to neatly categorize cases as a success or failure. There are aspects of each case that look promising for a time but then revert to the same or worse conditions. A qualitative approach is the only way to truly explain the varying levels of environmental protection and the various political influences. This project will use process tracing to follow the narrative of each case by looking at the actors involved and their actions. Process tracing allows for a more comprehensive story explaining how indigenous people organized and advocated for environmental and human rights issues. It will gather data from newspaper articles, scientific studies measuring the health and safety of the environment, court cases, legislation, in depth interviews, secondary source material.

In all of these cases international pressures are pulling in two directions: they want both transboundary protection among governments and the cheapest raw materials possible from each country's main industry. These conflicting desires put tremendous pressure on governments to make tradeoffs between overall economic growth and environmental protection for its citizens. To further understand how actors apply pressure on domestic and international terms it is useful to analyze each case applying Kevin Waltz's three level taxonomy which includes: international, domestic and individual. This project focuses primarily on international and domestic pressure but will sometimes rely on individual pressures for decision making for some elites.

The data gathered for this qualitative approach is found in newspaper articles, scientific studies evaluating changes to the environment, court cases, legislation, in depth interviews, and secondary source material.

Case Selection:

The Andean countries of South America present a political environment in which indigenous people are still a primary feature of political life. I selected Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia as the three countries from which cases of environmental degradation were chosen. There are a number of similarities in all three of these countries that make them ideal to study indigenous environmental movements. In terms of environmental degradation, population demographics and systems of government, these three countries are remarkably similar. These three countries are located in the Andes, have high percentage of their population that identifies as indigenous from both the Amazon region and mountainous regions, have presidential democracies with a concentration of power in the executive branch, and have governments that make a substantial amount of money off of rents from extractive resources. Although each country relies on different resources, each with their own set of environmental hazards, they all threaten the quality of local water sources and aquifers. Additionally, all of the industries have had protest movements with varying degrees of organizational support and success.

In order to understand how domestic and international pressures affect environmental movement outcomes in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, one case study has been selected from each country. Each case has varying levels of indigenous institutionalization within their governments. The cases are selected in order to show the bargaining power of all the involved actors and will account for both internal and external political factors. It will focus on national indigenous organizations and how they pursued their policy objective and acquire power. This

study will describe three cases in depth to immerse readers into the political climate in each country. The cases highlight the trials and tribulations of indigenous organizations in each case. Cases are evaluated on environmental cleanup, the creation of high environmental standards, and the continued enforcement of environmental policies.

The cases were selected from all major cases of environmental degradation that attracted a high rate of social protest reported in newspapers. The movements in La Oroya, the Oriente region of Ecuador, and the Isiboro Secure National Park (TIPNIS) were the three most likely cases to reach favorable environmental policy outcomes. This is because each case had high levels of international environmental advocacy due to egregious violations of human rights through environmental negligence and attracted the highest rates of protests in their respective countries. An in depth qualitative analysis of these three cases allows for a closer look at the causal mechanisms for the policy outcomes in each case.

The case of La Oroya, Peru will serve as a case in which positive environmental change was obtained when domestic political institutions were strong enough to enforce rules imposed by conditional lending from the World Bank decades earlier. Texaco operations in the Oriente region of Ecuador shows how well organized national institutions that work outside of the party system can create new environmental policy and shows how institutionalization of a movement can fail to address past degradation. The current battle over the construction of a road through TIPNIS in Bolivia demonstrates how indigenous groups can obtain environmental policy when they institutionalize, but also exposes inevitable policy debate between indigenous groups and the left leaning parties they associate with. In a number of ways each of these cases are similar to one another because their operations have been under either state or multinational ownership over time, but each gives a unique insight into how indigenous environmental policy gets

sidelined. The wider applicability of these cases is best understood through an analysis of the mechanisms that cause certain policy outcomes. That is not to say that these cases do not have competing explanatory features, but rather the mechanisms at play in each of these cases provided a logical series of cause and effect.

First, it is important to understand the varying degrees to which indigenous social movements have consolidated and the degree to which they have institutionalized into political parties; more specifically into ruling coalitions in the executive branch. Since Evo Morales became the president in 2006, Bolivia has the most integrated indigenous movement within its executive branch. The Morales government relies on what Raúl Madrid calls Ethno-populism: an appeal to both solidarity for the historically marginalized indigenous people in Bolivia as well as a broader appeal to the lowest income in society by promoting generous welfare spending. The administration combines nationalized industries, generous social spending and a promise for plurinational restructuring of government giving more power to indigenous groups in order to maintain its popular appeal. The indigenous party integration in Bolivia sits in stark contrast to Peru, which has had varying levels of indigenous integration historically but has lost most of its indigenous organization because of the violence from the Sendero Luminoso.

Indigenous representation in the executive branch in Peru has changed between and within administrations over time. For example, Alejandro Toledo advocated explicitly for indigenous territorial rights while campaigning but has been severely criticized by advocates of indigenous rights for prioritizing economic growth through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in extractive industries in mining, lumber and others. His government has been followed by a few others who have either used their indigenous identity as a campaign tool or have ignored it completely. Peru's indigenous movements are the least integrated in the institutionalized political

structure. Instead, indigenous and campesinos politics have materialized periodically as revolutionary groups such as Tupac Amaru's rebellion and the infamous Sendero Luminoso communist rebellion.

Ecuador is somewhere between Bolivia and Peru in terms of indigenous integration into its political life. The main indigenous party in Ecuador, Pachakutik (*Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik*), formed in 1996 and began to participate as an active party within Ecuador's multi-party democracy. It has maintained only 4-10 out of 100 seats in congress since its formation but has been criticized by many indigenous people as not representing them because it operates within the established Ecuadorian government. In other words, many indigenous peoples in Ecuador are still dubious of the institutionalization of their movement and the idea of state to begin with. A common factor these three countries share is the continued reliance on extractive industries like mining, natural gas and oil.

Each country relies undeniably on extractive practices as a huge part of its GDP, but there are differences in how each country is moving forward as well. Bolivia has generally been reluctant to get rid of protectionist policies to trade and opening up to FDI that benefit domestic industry. Conversely, Peru has increased overall trade by reducing tariffs on exports and imports. Leaders in Ecuador similarly do not want to privatize the oil industry and is vulnerable to global price fluctuations in oil. In the past 3 decades, leadership within Peru has generally sought to grow the Peruvian economy by promoting trade openness and attracting international investors. Ecuador dollarized its economy when it experienced hyperinflation and its currency depreciated by 70%, and its economy is stagnating at a relatively low growth rate compared to Bolivia and Peru.

Peru continues to struggle in regards to water and air quality in areas near mining operation despite a general environmental improvements in the last 10 years. This general improvement can be attributed to international pressure to reduce greenhouse emissions and general improvements in technology. This general improvement is actually found in all three countries. One example of a failed policy implementation is the PAMA regulations for La Oroya, 2007 world's most polluted city. The Peruvian government put regulations reducing particulate emissions, air lead levels, cadmium levels, arsenic levels and an elimination of liquid discharge from the smelter. Doe run, the company that owns the smelter, reports a reduction in all of those areas but this has not been verified by any outside agency (Orihuela).

Ecuador suffers mostly from deforestation from companies searching for more oil reserves and from oil operations polluting surrounding areas. As of 2004 15% of Ecuador is protected from oil exploration. This type of pollution is different from pollutions in both Peru and Bolivia, but is subject to similar forces for change. The environmental outlook for Ecuador is not very promising either.

In conclusion three states with varying levels of indigenous integration in government are all fail to adhere to practices that protect indigenous communities from extractive practices such as mining, natural gas and oil. The following cases provide a more complete analysis of indigenous social movement in relation to specific environmental cases in each of these countries. The overall environmental outlook for local communities remains bleak in spite of the capacity to organize and mobilize that the national level.

The Case of La Oroya in Peru:

In 1922, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation started mining copper and created an industrial smelter that quickly became infamous for releasing lead, Sulphur dioxide, cadmium and arsenic contaminants in the surrounding environment. There was virtually no regulation on air or water pollution by the Peruvian government at the time. Discontent among local hacienda owners and indigenous communities eventually led them to take action resulting in the first government commissioned remediation settlement. The government mandated the Cerro de Pasco Corporation to buy polluted land making the Cerro de Pasco Corporation the largest landowner in the Andes by the late 1960s.² In 1974, the smelter at La Oroya was nationalized and administrated by the state owned company CENTROMIN. It operated under CENTROMIN until it was bought by Doe Run in 1997 during Peru's transition to a neoliberal political economy.³ Doe Run is part of the larger U.S. multinational Renco Group which has mines and smelters in both South and North America.

La Oroya has seen a lot of activism both in support of the implementation of stricter environmental regulations on behalf of public health but also in support of Doe Run's continued existence in La Oroya because of the jobs the company provides. Although Peru and the Consejo Nacional del Medio Ambiente in Peru (CONAM) had environmental laws in place when the government initially began regulating La Oroya in the days of Cerro Pasco Corporation, there still was no environmental authority regulating the mining industry consistently until 2007.⁴ This change came after international pressure by human rights groups when La Oroya was ranked one

² Becker, D. (2014). *The New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency. Mining, Class, and Power in Revolutionary Peru*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Retrieved 27 Jan. 2018, from <https://www-degruyter-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/product/453057>

³ Orihuela, José Carlos. 2014. "The Environmental Rules of Economic Development: Governing Air Pollution from Smelters in Chuquicamata and La Oroya." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 46(01): 151–83.

⁴ *Ibid.* Orihuela, José Carlos

of the dirtiest cities in the world in 2007 by Forbes magazine.⁵ In order to understand the political pressures and institutional accountability failures of the CENTROMIN it is important to understand the economic and political history of Peru more broadly.

After the economic struggles of what is commonly called the “Lost decade of Latin American” (1980s), Alberto Fujimori won the presidency against novelist Mario Vargas Llosa by appealing to populist sentiments. Although Fujimori heavily criticized Vargas Llosa’s preference for shock economic practices during the race, he quickly instituted austerity measures in order to cut inflation and attract stimulus packages from international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).⁶ Two years later, Fujimori instituted constitutional reform which ensured his party would have the majority of legislative seats undermining the very democratic institutions that got him elected.⁷ Fujimori and his prime minister, Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller recognized the hardships economic shock would cause for the poorest Peruvians and installed a wide scale social emergency program that would cushion the effects felt by that population.⁸ Meanwhile, Fujimori’s government declared a state of emergency in response to the Maoist revolutionary group Sendero Luminoso which created havoc in the country side by conducting some of the most terrible intra-rural poor massacres in Peruvian history.⁹

After Alberto Fujimori’s presidency ended in 2000, Peru was ready for a more left wing government, which it sought with Alejandro Toledo’s green liberalism and emphasis on the

⁵ Malone, Robert. 2013. “In Pictures: World's Dirtiest Cities.” *Forbes*.

⁶ Graham, Carol. 1993. “Economic Austerity and the Peruvian Crisis: The Social Cost of Autocracy.” *SAIS Review* 13(1): pg. 50

⁷ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. 2017. “Alberto Fujimori.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alberto-Fujimori> (January 29, 2018).

⁸ *Ibid.* Graham, Carol

⁹ Puente, Javier. 2017. “Making Peru's Sendero Luminoso: The Geography & Ecology of Civil War.” *Age of Revolutions*. <https://ageofrevolutions.com/2017/03/29/making-perus-sendero-luminoso-the-geography-ecology-of-civil-war/> (January 29, 2018).

environment. Although Toledo himself identifies as indigenous,¹⁰ he largely preferred the neoliberal economic model that relied on foreign direct investment from multinational corporations which hurt many indigenous communities. Toledo's party platform combined promises of policy addressing problems related to indigenous groups and environmental problems with neoliberal implementation of open markets to spur economic growth. These loyalties often contradicted one another forcing Toledo and his party to prioritize neoliberal economic policies over the preferences of regional indigenous groups. Toledo chose to prioritize what would ultimately help GDP growth in the economy by having lenient restrictions on the mining industry to facilitate as much macro-economic growth as possible.

The historical context in the case of Peru is fundamental to understanding the ways in which people thought about social movements and protests during Fujimori's presidency and how the neoliberal economic model maintained its dominance over the Peruvian political elites. In rural areas contempt for neoliberal ideologies grew due to wide spread poverty and continued resentment for the traditional hierarchical structure that had existed in Latin America; the colonial age set the stage for the radical and violent guerilla group to firmly root itself.¹¹ Javier Puente argues that much of the violence during the 1980s from Sendero Luminoso happened as a result of substantial droughts which heightened intra-community conflict based on scarce resources.¹² Puente's argument draws a clear connection between ecological problems, contempt for status-quo neoliberalism and social conflict in rural communities in Peru. Additionally, the historical context of social conflict in rural Peru, as manifested by el Sendero Luminoso, and the well-documented political corruption and repression by the Fujimori government provides an

¹⁰ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. 2017. "Alejandro Toledo." *Encyclopædia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alejandro-Toledo#ref1047906> (January 29, 2018).

¹¹ *Ibid.* Graham, Carol

¹² *Ibid.* Puente, Javier

understanding of the larger political conflicts, and the fragility of democratic institutions that coincide with conflicts over mining and smelting practices.

The case at La Oroya presents peasant, as opposed to indigenous, reactions to mining and smelting operations. Protests to environmental degradation at La Oroya tended to be ad hoc as opposed to sustained protests organized consistently by one or a few organizations. Although a large portion of the population in Peru identifies as indigenous they are far less likely to collectively advocate based on that identity. Peru has a less organized indigenous movement at the national level than both Bolivia and Ecuador despite having 45% of its population reporting to be indigenous and 37% reporting to be mestizo.¹³ In the long history of political debate and discourse regarding La Oroya, there are occasions in which indigenous groups are effected but, the larger political actors are primarily elites from Lima, international institutions and the local workers' union. The case of La Oroya reflects a substantial policy change throughout the smelter's existence, culminating in fairly strict environmental regulations due primarily to the severity of public health problems unique to the smelter. Unfortunately, much of the policy change has not resulted in action that effectively and consistently regulates air emissions, water contamination and implements soil remediation programs.

What is important in the case of La Oroya is that protesters do not muster support via appeals to indigenous identity. There are no organized indigenous groups advocating on their behalf, and appealing to a sense of comradeship as a historically oppressed group, nor did Toledo's government recognize this as an "indigenous" problem and advocated on behalf of the resident of La Oroya. This is true despite Toledo's indigenous identity and La Oroya's highly indigenous population. Unlike Evo Morales' Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) party, *Peru Posible* (Toledo's

¹³ "The World Factbook: PERU." 2018. *Central Intelligence Agency*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html> (January 29, 2018).

party) does not make explicit claims on behalf of organized indigenous communities in mining and extractive struggles. Perhaps, the ethnic makeup in highlands Peru does not lend itself to consolidated political activism on behalf of an indigenous identity. One scholar suggests that *indigenismo* identity constructed in Cusco is largely a result of performance and folklorization of indigenous identity as a way to play to tourist expectations and increase profits.¹⁴ That is indigenous organization and identification in Peru is a way of distinguishing itself compared to people from outside of Peru. The main reason indigenous leadership and organization has been stunted compared to neighboring countries is political suppression from el Sendero Luminoso who killed any leftist leaders who might represent a threat in terms of competition. Despite lack of indigenous organization, the case of La Oroya presents a useful false-positive in which environmental regulation is created but not enforced, and in which indigenous communities are affected but do not mobilize in any substantial way. This case also demonstrates the failure of institutions that were created simply to comply with international norms as opposed to an internal political will to implement an environmental agency to keep mining accountable.

In 1990, the Código del Medio Ambiente y Recurso Nacionales established that environmental authority was under federal control, but the law was amended in 1991 to promote foreign direct investment.¹⁵ Structural adjustment programs brought on by the World Bank contributed to the privatization of much of the mining industry but also established environmental regulation which previously did not exist.¹⁶ Although the passage of this law to begin with marks what many would consider a success, the Ministry of Energy and Mining could

¹⁴ McFaddenb, Heather Faith. 2012. ProQuest "Constructing Indigenous Identity in Peru: From Indigenismo to Toursim." <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1282648992?pq-origsite=summon>

¹⁵ [http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/76865407EB58EB6F05257E2E0050C544/\\$FILE/DL_708_LeyPromoci%C3%B3nDeInversionesEnElSectorMinero.pdf](http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/76865407EB58EB6F05257E2E0050C544/$FILE/DL_708_LeyPromoci%C3%B3nDeInversionesEnElSectorMinero.pdf)

¹⁶ <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/410671468079729976/pdf/335450a1PE0studio0Mineria.pdf>

not strictly enforce those laws. Although the law for environmental regulation in mining was formally established in 1992-3, air quality standards were not specified until 1996, remediation was not planned until 1997, and neither of these standards were actually enforced.¹⁷

The political economy and democratic institutions in Peru could not support the degree of environmental regulation administered by the World Bank. Instead of environmental regulation at La Oroya coming about via an autonomous political process, it came as a result of conditionality on World Bank loans which encouraged privatization as part of structural adjustment.¹⁸ Within the Fujimori government there was a deep seated distrust for how government itself could effectively run the mining industry. In an interview with María Chappuis, and César Polo, two central figures in Fujimori's mining ministry argued that "The big idea was to promote private investment because the state had failed."¹⁹ The state wanted to attract new investment and cut its own spending in order to boost economic growth and reallocate tax dollars. Environmental reform came only as a result of World Bank officials advocating and ultimately making loans conditional on its behalf. There was a distrust of the state's capacity to either run a successful company at all or additionally implement environmental standards the state hadn't actually wanted. The state had no ownership of the green reforms imposed on it by the World Bank. This idea is made abundantly clear when we consider the 1992 air quality standards which were not actually specified until 1996, or the soil remediation plan which was not made until Doe Run bought the plant in 1997. Neither plan actually was implemented by CENTROMIN nor Doe Run.²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibid. Orihuela, José Carlos* (172)

¹⁸ *Ibid. Orihuela, José Carlos*

¹⁹ Interview with Maria Chappuis, 15 Feb. 2008, and César Polo, 3 Apr. 2008 from José Carlos Orihuela

²⁰ *Ibid. Orihuela, José Carlos*

The state's intentions of actually regulating the La Oroya smelter are made clear when one looks at the resources the federal government actually put into the regulatory agency for mining. The Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales (DGAA), which was created in 1992 as part of a deal with the World Bank, had only 6 technical staff members measuring the impacts of the smelter and overseeing compliance with regulations.²¹ Meanwhile, the national environmental authority (CONAM) took a subsidiary role as the ministries remained the more important environmental authorities. In 2006, another organizational shift put the responsibility of overseeing soil remediation to the Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Energía y Minería (OSINERGMIN).

In 2007, OSINERGMIN put the first environmental fine of US\$ 250,000 on Doe Run for failing to adhere to air quality standards and dumping effluent into the Mantaro River in three places without treatment or permits, for lacking a management system for Sulphur dioxide emissions and for practicing careless transportation of hazardous material.²² The fine comes after 4 extensions to meet environmental standards of the remediation plan given to the company by the Ministry of Energy in the 10 years Doe Run had operated the facility. Doe Run claimed on several occasions that it could not adhere to the remediation plan nor invest in greener technology to reduce initial pollution. The reduction plan was estimated to cost US\$ 196 million, which the company claimed it could not pay. Shortly thereafter a journalist from *El Comercio* discovered that the company had remitted US\$ 100 million in profits to the Renco Group in the U.S.²³ With Doe Run's financial stability at question, there was a wave of anti-environmental

²¹ World Bank, *Riqueza y sostenibilidad* p. 65

²² OSINERGMIN, 'Informe: examen especial sobre normas de protección y conservación del ambiente realizado en el complejo metalúrgico La Oroya', Lima, 2007 José Carlos Orihuela

²³ Diversos, artículos. 1970. "Contaminacion en la Oroya - Perú." *Centromín y Doe Run en desacuerdo sobre descontaminación de La Oroya*. <http://oroyaperu.blogspot.com/2007/12/centromn-y-doe-run-en-desacuerdo-sobre.html> (January 29, 2018).

protest so that the town would maintain jobs, leading to a 5th extension on remediation and adherence to air quality in 2009, when the company also filed for bankruptcy. The Ministry of Energy and Mining then revoked Doe Run's extension, fined the company US\$ 163,046,495.00 for failing to meet its environmental obligations specified in Programa de Adecuación y Manejo Ambiental or Environmental Remediation and Management Program (PAMA) within CENTROMIN.²⁴ Doe Run filed for bankruptcy and failed to build the sulfuric acid plant that would curb emissions. The plant shut down for three years. Doe Run appealed the proceedings in 2012, where the court stayed consistent with the 2009 ruling maintaining that Doe Run is required to complete the PAMA environmental standards to continue operations.²⁵ Zinc and lead mining circuits were restarted in 2012 but were then halted in 2014 after infighting among creditors. Shortly thereafter, the group of creditors decided to sell the plant. Doe Run owes up US\$ 600 million to a group of about 100 creditors and the creditors took severe losses.²⁶

In 2013, CENTROMIN implemented an air quality standard that reduce from 80 ug/m³ to 20 ug/m³ of damaging substances for all mining operations but allowed certain companies extensions on when they can meet those standards; Doe Run was one of those companies.²⁷ The ministry of Mining and Energy promised to continue to try and reduce the levels of pollutants in the air but still have failed. According to a 2016 study conducted by Asociación Proderechos Humanos (APRODEH), AIDA and Yale researchers, there are still levels of lead, cadmium and sulfur dioxide that exceed the government's standards in the air at La Oroya.²⁸

²⁴ http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3004/C-136_Eng.pdf

²⁵ <https://peru.com/2012/05/17/actualidad/economia-y-finanzas/junta-acreedores-doe-run-peru-elegira-al-liquidador-oroya-noticia-64539>

²⁶ <http://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/metals/doe-run-loses-peru-ruling-on-us163mn-fine1/>

²⁷ *CASE OF THE COMMUNITY OF LA OROYA, PERU*. AIDA: Protecting our Right to a Healthy Environment . <http://www.aida-america.org/sites/default/files/La%20Oroya%20Fact%20Sheet%20ENG%2014-02-12.pdf>

²⁸ Wooten, Nicholas. *Heavy Metal Air Pollution in La Oroya, Peru*. Yale School of Forestry Environmental Studies Blog. <https://environment.yale.edu/blog/2016/02/heavy-metal-air-pollution-in-la-oroya-peru/>

This decision to let Doe Run bypass environmental requirements by several administrations was based off of the argument that Doe Run provided economic opportunities that trump environmental degradation and public health crisis in La Oroya. This argument is often made by Peruvian politicians in regards to extractive practices, putting the ‘greater public good’ ahead of those suffering directly from the degradation. These governments balance social, environmental and economic considerations. This is exactly the argument made by Fujimori, Toledo, Alan García, Ollanta Humala Tasso, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. It is important to note that the La Oroya case is a political battle between domestic and international bureaucratic agencies, creditors, and the multinational corporation Doe Run. Although the World Bank initially implemented environmental regulations as conditionality it left a questionable Peruvian democracy in charge of the implementation of those regulations. It was not until more recently that Doe Run was held, temporarily, to the standards specified in the PAMA agreement when moved under the authority of OSINERGMIN. Although indigenous communities are part of the population effected by the pollution at the plant in La Oroya, the entire political battle was confined to bureaucracies. Only when jobs within the town were threatened were residents motivated enough to protest in favor of Doe Run, as opposed to against it. Doe Run provides a ‘best case scenario’ in terms of political forces applied to change environmental standards. The environmental degradation and public health risks were so egregious that international institutions, human rights groups, and technocrats within particular government agencies agreed that something needed to be done, but the government still failed to enforce the environmental standards put in place. In the larger Peruvian environmental struggle against mining and extractive practices, the level of indigenous organization found in La Oroya is commonplace but

the environmental impact at La Oroya is the most extreme form environmental degradation in Peru.

The Case of Texaco in Ecuador


The case of Texaco and Chevron in the Oriente region of Ecuador presents one of the most contentious political and legal battles in the history of environmental litigation. Oil is the most important export in the Ecuadorian economy making the legal battle over land rights in oil rich indigenous territories in the heart of the Ecuadorian Amazon one of the highest profile environmental battles in history. It also presents a case in which the fragmentation of indigenous political organizations as well as corruption has led to an environmental outcome that allows the parties on the left to save face without taking responsibility for the pollution caused by Petro Ecuador. Ecuador's historical dependence on oil as an export, the salience of indigenous politics surrounding the region, and the ecological importance of the Amazon more broadly have produced an extremely contentious case for all parties involved. The fight over land rights and pollution in the Oriente region demonstrates well how varying commitments to formalized political institutions can function as extremely important bargaining tool for indigenous groups. The case of Chevron-Texaco in Ecuador resulted in an \$8 billion settlement issued by the Ecuadorian government against Chevron for environmental remediation. This ruling is not an environmental win because it is incorrectly ruled, unenforceable, and actually avoids environmental cleanup and remediation on behalf of the Ecuadorian government. Political mobilization of indigenous groups at an institutional level failed to keep the Ecuadorian government under President Rafael Correa accountable. Most of the academics who trace the litigation against Texaco will tend to focus on the actions of Steve Donziger, but this account will focus primarily on the change of indigenous institutions, and they failed to influence the litigation against Texaco. The case of Texaco in Ecuador shows the increasing importance of organized indigenous mobilization to begin with, how the timing and manner of indigenous

institutionalization can greatly influence how effective indigenous politics can move environmental policy, the somewhat tenuous alliance of the Pachakutik with more traditionally left leaning parties, and the diversity of interest that indigenous groups have over such a large land mass.

In 1972, Gulf Oil and Texaco Petroleum Company started exporting oil when the Trans-Ecuadorian pipeline was completed.²⁹ This came shortly after a military coup led by General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara against the last 5 non-consecutive José Velasco regimes. Two years later Ecuador joined OPEC, making the country a member of one of the most powerful commodity cartels in the world. Oil in Ecuador has been the subject of political tensions since its inception in 1972 because of the role that land has in terms of power in Ecuador. This is evident from contentious debates that came as a result of the 1964 agrarian reform that redistributed land to a large section of the population but did not truly address the semi-feudal economic system that many Ecuadorian campesinos still faced. Although the utilization of land for oil has been debated for such a long time and the role of oil has fluctuated because of global price fluctuations, Ecuador on average has become more dependent on oil as time has gone on. Similar to other cases of countries dependent on a few commodity products, Ecuador's economy was extremely sensitive to fluctuations in prices. When the demand for oil in the 1980s decreased, Ecuador dropped the price of oil per barrel despite other OPEC requests to maintain the current

²⁹Gillis, Carly. "Ecuador vs Texaco-Chevron: A Brief History." *Counterspill.org*

oil price.³⁰ The Ecuadorian government needed the revenue from oil so desperately that it was willing to deviate from OPEC price controls. Oil extraction inevitably leads to a certain amount of environmental degradation which can be devastating for an environment as ecologically rich and biodiverse as the Amazon rainforest. The Texaco Corporation's and later Chevron Texaco's operations there led to the largest fine in environmental lawsuit in history. After decades of legal proceedings the Ecuadorian courts fined Texaco and Chevron US\$ 8.6 billion in 2011 rewarded to the plaintiffs of Lago Agrio and for environmental cleanup and remediation. Similar to the case of La Oroya in Peru, and TIPNIS in Bolivia, the battle for environmental cleanup against Texaco is fought by both international actors and indigenous communities. The main international actors in this case were a team of U.S. and Ecuadorian lawyers conducting the class action lawsuit. Indigenous organizations did not play as large of a role in advocating for



³⁰ *Ibid.* Gillis

environmental cleanup because they lacked consolidated power within the federal government. The political obstacles of environmental cleanup are unfortunate due to the persistent level of environmental degradation in the region.

A Harvard Study conducted in 1993 found that 33 nano-grammes of hydrocarbons were found in samples of drinking and bathing water in the Oriente region where Texaco operated. The study posits that any traceable amount of hydrocarbons in water leads to a significantly higher chance of cancer.³¹ Cancer rates in oil producing regions of Ecuador are actually 31% whereas cancer rates in the rest of the country are 12.3% for the rest of the country.³² These results are particularly troubling when one considers that 65% of Ecuador's Amazon is zoned for oil activities.³³ Similar to the other cases in this study, the case against Texaco in Ecuador is one that was most likely to gain successful policy outcomes due to the level of degradation and the international attention case attracted. This was the largest suit against any oil company in history but it still failed to clean up or address many of the environmental and public health issues associated with oil extraction in the region. One possible lens for understanding this failed case is through the manner in which indigenous organizations came to form the Pachakutik party out of the CONAIE. The Pachakutik represents the worst-case scenario of social movement institutionalization in which the majority of movement's original support quickly became dubious of the Pachakutik's intentions.

Ecuador has had a relatively short history of indigenous organization in the context of colonial history of Latin America. It is not until the 20th century indigenous communities began

³¹ Edwin, Joeseph. "Toxic Threat in Ecuador Rainforest." *New Straits Times*. <https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=btNQAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=mxMEAAAAIIBAJ&pg=1320,3779061&dq=texaco ecuador&hl=en> (February 9, 2018).

³² Acosta, Alberto "La Maldición de la Abundancia" (Quito, Ecuador: Abya Yala, 2009), 75

³³ <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/lib/unc/reader.action?docID=718687&ppg=1>

to organize into unified social movements and later enter the national political scene. The emergence of organized indigenous groups came largely as a result of the economic arrangement based around the *hacienda* so common to Latin America. The *hacienda* model is one often likened to feudalism because the small number of land owners have the majority of the country's wealth and everyone else is left economically and therefore politically disenfranchised. The hacienda economic model came about as a result of the colonial model which created infrastructure to export agricultural products and raw materials such as oil, minerals and natural gas. The result was a rigid social and economic hierarchy in which indigenous groups were at the bottom. With the exception of small and unorganized indigenous rebellions, this system was not effectively protested by indigenous groups until the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE) appealed to indigenous communities in the 1930s. The PSE won several seats but prioritized its urban working base over rural indigenous communities.³⁴ Ecuador's communist party also appealed to a coalition of indigenous communities with the formation of the Ecuadorian Indian Federation (FEI) in 1944. Both groups failed to meet the needs of their indigenous constituencies and fell out of favor with indigenous groups. The FEI, however, successfully linked *serrano* indigenous communities together for the time which has been critical for later indigenous movements.³⁵ The PSE and the FEI were the first major alliances with parties on the left and indigenous groups. Although the socialist and the communist parties shared a deep resentment for the hacienda model with indigenous peoples, there were fundamental disagreements over policy goals between the left and indigenous people.

³⁴ Pallares, Amalia. *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance: The Ecuadorian Andes in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

³⁵ Van Cott, Donna Lee, *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press 2005

Similar to Peru and Bolivia, the alignment of indigenous movements with political parties on the left is not surprising given the shared goal of overthrowing the hacienda system of government. It is not until the Agrarian Reform Laws of 1964 and 1973, both published under military dictatorships, that the hacienda system was truly challenged. General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, the head of the 1972 coup said that the “Indian problem” would disappear and that “We all become white men when we accept the goals of a national culture.”³⁶ The agrarian reform laws were largely encouraged by the U.S. because of the fear that a leftist revolution or similar to the Cuban Revolution would emerge as a result of the continued brutality of the hacienda system. Although the goals of these programs were far from benevolent attempts to make a more equitable society, they did in fact weaken indigenous identity in some profound ways. The Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI) was an organization that was led by non-indigenous urban intellectuals that worked to organize members of the lowest socio-economic class with indigenous groups throughout the country. The idea that social status determined one’s life prospects rather than ethnic ties grew in popularity and had real political consequences. Indigenous peoples largely organized as members of the rural working class instead of on ethnic lines. This process is considered *campesinismo* by political scientist Amalia Pallares.³⁷ The creation of The Confederation of Quichua People of Ecuador (ECUARUNARI), Ecuador’s first trans-provincial indigenous organization in 1972, was an effort to bridge class and ethnic political identities.³⁸ That same year, Rodríguez Lara strategically staged a military coup shortly after the completion of the Trans-Ecuadorian pipeline that expands from Ecuador’s Oriente

³⁶ Whitten, Norman E., Jr. 1976 *Sacha Runa: Ethnicity and Adaption of Ecuadorian Junle Quichua*. Urbana: University Illinois Press. (268)

³⁷ Mijeski, Kenneth J., and Scott H. Beck., *Pachakutik and the rise and decline of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement*.

³⁸ Ibid. Mijeski and Beck

Region to the coast was completed.³⁹ ECUARUNARI experienced a great deal success initially but soon fell victim to the same subordination of indigenous leaders by their white and mestizo counterparts as the FEI and the PSE experienced.

The compulsory voting system in Ecuador was also disadvantageous for indigenous social movements, because indigenous people were more likely to vote for left leaning parties who only tangentially advocated for indigenous rights. The left was far more appealing in comparison to their conservative counterparts. Parties on the left had less of an obligation to their indigenous constituents, compared to their lower class urban base. Instead, parties had an incentive to pander to swing voters in order to sway public appeal in their direction. This recurring problem was so apparent that CONAIE's leaders systematically discouraged voting despite the legal obligation Ecuadorian citizens had to vote. It instead wanted to construct the indigenous social movement outside of the formalized political institutions in order to form a more unified indigenous base.⁴⁰ CONAIE advocated boycotting the elections of 1989 to 1992 so that their political agendas would be taken seriously by the left.⁴¹

Although indigenous movements have generally aligned with the left, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) formed during the Luis Febres Cordero Munoz administration in November, 1986. CONAIE had concerned with issues related to territorial rights since its inception, but clarified its position in 1990 with a list of sixteen demands including self-rule, political autonomy, respect for customs and "Indian" participation in decisions regarding oil exploration on indigenous land.⁴² These demands were seen as a fairly

³⁹ *Ibid.* Mijeski and Beck

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* Mijeski and Beck (16)

⁴¹ *Ibid.* Van Cott (117)

⁴² *Ibid.* Mijeski and Beck

radical political statement that sought complete national autonomy that rivaled the Ecuadorian state. Also in 1990, Petroecuador gained complete control over the facilities in the Oriente region created initially by Texaco.⁴³ The Ecuadorian state relied so heavily on oil from the region that the prospect of a parallel state organization in oil territory threatened the Ecuadorian government. In 1992, CONAIE organized and executed the largest protests in Ecuadorian history in which thousands of indigenous people marched from Puyo to Quito demanding recognition and autonomy.⁴⁴

By 1995 President Rodrigo Borjo refused to recognize the political autonomy of indigenous groups but instead offered more than a million hectares of land.⁴⁵ CONAIE continued to use mobilization as opposed institutionalized strategy out of fear that their political needs will be sidelined like in the case of the FEI, PSE and ECUARUNARI. In 1994, CONAIE formed a coalition with other groups in order to defeat the neoliberal referendum proposed by President Sixto Durán Bellén. The coalition successfully campaigned for electoral regulations that would facilitate easier registration for political parties and permit the formation of interparty alliances. This coalition consisted of people who worked middle-class sectors that opposed the privatization of social security and other similar policies. CONAIE's coalition preferred advocacy through protests and boycotts as opposed to mobilizing their electorate to the polls.⁴⁶

With Durán's defeat in 1995 and more lenient rules allowing for party formation, CONAIE faced an important question for the future of indigenous politics in Ecuador: Should CONAIE form a political party that participates in the formal Ecuadorian political system? This

⁴³ "Endgame in Ecuador." *Chevron in Ecuador: A Timeline of Events*.
https://www.eenews.net/special_reports/ecuador/timeline (February 12, 2018).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Mijeski and Beck

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Pallares

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* Mijeski and Beck 38

question was the subject of debate between leadership from the two major groups within CONAIE. The Oriente region, represented by a major political confederation in the Amazon called the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Amazon of Ecuador (CONFENIAIE), advocated for electoral participation. The Sierra coalition within CONAIE, represented by ECUARUNARI, worried that problems specific to indigenous peoples would get coopted by other parties as side issues.⁴⁷ Their worries were not unwarranted given the fact that 50% of the state's budget is accounted for by oil revenue by 1994, and the history of cooptation of indigenous groups historically in Ecuador. Additionally, 50% of the budget went to pay back international debt, meaning working within the Ecuadorian government would mean working within the Washington Consensus.⁴⁸ Luis Macas, the president of CONAIE during 1995 argued that CONAIE might be sidelined by other parties that have more widespread appeal.⁴⁹

In 1993, CONAIE's congress decided that they would participate in elections but no leaders from CONAIE would hold public office. Macas, himself, denied an invitation to run as vice president during the 1996 elections.⁵⁰ Later that year, an abrupt change of doctrine led CONAIE to join forces with Coordinator of Social Movements (CMS), and Nuevo País to form the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement (MUPP-NP), most commonly referred to as Pachakutik.⁵¹ Luis Macas soon became a politician for Pachakutik while CONAIE maintained its position as a separate organization that will continue its mobilization strategy. The word Pachakutik itself is a Kichwa word that means change and rebirth, which could not better describe the complete about face CONAIE had as a strategy.⁵² Maintaining its institutional

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Van Cott (117)

⁴⁸ Hanratty, Dennis Michael. "Ecuador: A Country Study." <https://www.loc.gov/item/91009494/>.

⁴⁹ Luis macas, Quito, May 2000

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* Becker 1996

⁵¹ *Ibid.* Mijeski and Beck

⁵² <http://www.yachana.org/pachakutik/>

independence, CONAIE would continue with its strategy to mobilize informally while Pachakutik will pursue an electoral strategy. This plan might have worked if the institutional ties between the two organizations were not as apparent. The Pachakutik had a relatively successful showing in its first election when it won 20% of the vote. It, however, attracted a smaller percent of the electorate over time as more indigenous groups dissociated with the party. Not only did CONAIE lose much of its power, but Pachakutik's electoral failure delegitimized the perception that an indigenous party could represent all indigenous peoples at a national level; leaving advocates of universal indigenous politics such as territorial rights and conservation outside the center of power.

The class action lawsuit against Texaco, *Aguinda vs Ecuador*, began in 1993 when Steven Donziger filed a suit in the Southern District of New York over contamination in Lago Agrio and surrounding areas in Ecuador. This came the same year that Texaco sold its facilities to the Ecuadorian State.⁵³ Two years later, the serving deputy Minister of Energy and Mines signed an agreement with Texaco requiring the company to remediate 37.5% of the Orient oil sites. This percentage reflected Texaco's ownership stake from 1977 through the dissolution of the venture. It additionally claimed to investigate 133 wells sites and seven spill areas, claiming to invest a total of US \$40 million in work.⁵⁴ The rest of the pollution was left in the hands of Petroecuador.⁵⁵ However, both Texaco and the Ecuadorian government failed to completely cleanup the environment polluted by their operations claiming the other is responsible for the environmental degradation. The major short coming in this case was that Texaco only had an obligation to clean up about one third of the actual pollution it had caused since 1972. The joint

⁵³ "Endgame in Ecuador." *Chevron in Ecuador: A Timeline of Events*.

⁵⁴ Barrett, Paul M. 2014. *Law of the Jungle: The \$19 Billion Legal Battle Over Oil in the Rain Forest and the Lawyer Who'd Stop at Nothing to Win*. New York: Crown Publishers.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* Barret pg 56

operation caused far more damage than what Texaco was mandated to cleanup, and not the fight was to decide who would bear the burden of the damages they both caused.

In 1996, the Sixto Durán Ballén government had appointed a new deputy for the Ministry of Energy and Mines, leaving the organization who agreed to hold Texaco accountable with a complete change of personnel. Shortly thereafter, the new president, Abdalá Bucaram, reversed the country's decision on the initial *Aguinda* settlement.⁵⁶ Litigation continued in New York, but the death of Judge Broderick caused serious problems for the prosecutors. Broderick was far more sympathetic to the indigenous people suffering as a result of oil pollution and was willing to try the case. Broderick's replacement Judge Rakoff quickly dismissed the suit arguing that the authority of the U.S. judiciary "does not include a general writ to right the world's wrongs."⁵⁷ Texaco strategically agreed to be tried in Ecuadorian jurisdiction right after the government in Ecuador certified that Texaco had fully performed the oil-field remediation and would be "released, absolved, and discharged forever" from any further liability in the region.⁵⁸ Prosecutors preferred American courts for the trial because they feared Ecuadorian judges would be bribed or manipulated by oil interests. The political environment in Ecuador favored oil companies who contributed more money to the government than any other industry in the country over indigenous groups whose center of power operated outside of normal politics.

In 1999, the Environmental Management Law passed under the Jamil Mahuad's regime that was a center left coalition that moved slightly to the right by 2000. This law provided hope for indigenous peoples that a coalition with may work. The act along with Forest Law (article 39) stated that indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples will have priority in the use of

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* Barret pg 63

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* Barret (63)

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Barret

community lands and forest products and that the local authorities must consult these peoples before issuing policies regarding their lands.⁵⁹ Mahuad's legislation largely came out of fear from the indigenous uprising as opposed to a legal democratic process. The 1997 protest led by CONAIE led an influential protest for constitutional reform and for keeping oil companies accountable played a pivotal role in creating the law.⁶⁰ The enactment of the Environmental Management Law demonstrates how CONAIE's grass roots strategy mobilizing popular protests has been more effective in changing policy than working within the unstable political institutions in Ecuador. This law also made the prospect of transferring the case against Texaco and the Petroecuador to Ecuadorian courts more attainable.

The next critical moment in the case against Texaco and now Chevron, who acquired Texaco in 2000, was in 2003 when the new government under Rafael Correa announced a criminal investigation into two lawyers, officials from Petroecuador and the former Ecuadorian government. All of whom worked on the 1995 settlement with Texaco that understated the responsibility Texaco had in polluting the Oriente region.⁶¹ The Chevron Texaco Corporation argued that it was independent of Texaco INC. which operated prior to Chevron's involvement and therefore Chevron had no financial obligations to clean up the environment. The courts disagreed after a judicial inspections that lasted from 2004 to 2008 were conducted. An independent expert recommended that Chevron pay US\$ 7-16 billion.⁶² Ultimately the court

⁵⁹ "Laws & Regulations." *Ecuador | Forest Legality*. <http://www.forestlegality.org/risk-tool/country/ecuador> (February 12, 2018).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* Mijeski and Beck

⁶¹ "Endgame in Ecuador." *Chevron in Ecuador: A Timeline of Events*.

⁶² "Texaco/Chevron lawsuits (Re Ecuador)." 2017. *Business & Human Rights Resource Centre*. <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador> (February 12, 2018).

ruled that Chevron should pay \$8.6 billion for damages to cleanup and remediation projects around Lago Agrio.

The case becomes more complicated when Chevron gets the international arbitration panel to intervene in 2009, and then files a countersuit for racketeering in 2011 in U.S. courts which found that Donziger manipulated evidence, and bribed the judge that ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The ruling in Ecuador remains despite a U.S. court's decision. It is not simply that the infrastructure in the Ecuadorian government was not strong enough to make Chevron enforce the court's decision, it is that the decision was unenforceable. The Ecuadorian government actually had an incentive to keep the ruling because they would no longer be responsible for cleaning up the damages from Petroecuador who also polluted a substantial amount in the region.

The main political actors behind the decision against Texaco were foreign lawyers as opposed to an organized indigenous coalition demanding higher environmental standards across the region. The Pachakutik had virtually no power over the case of environmental degradation in the Oriente region. President Correa finally implemented a resettlement against Texaco calling for Chevron to pay more money for remediation. In doing so Correa conveniently removed the burden of cleanup from his government and appealed to much of the indigenous population. The resettlement called for cleanup but the Ecuadorian government was in no position to actually enforce its decision. It is undeniable that the organizational infrastructure provided by CONAIE was pivotal for building institutions like the Environmental Management Act of 1999 which happened independently of Pachakutik. Organized national indigenous protest through CONAIE was far more successful at moving policy than the Pachakutik which worked within the formal political framework.

Case in Bolivia

Evo Morales' ascent to power in 2006 through his socialist MAS party represented a period of hope for indigenous communities in Bolivia. As the first leader in Bolivian history who identifies himself indigenous, Morales took pride in doing as much for indigenous people as possible. Likewise, indigenous people were excited by the opportunity created by placing a member of their own historically marginalized group in the most powerful position in the country. In addition to indigenous groups, Morales appealed to the urban poor with his message opposing American imperialism and promising welfare programs to improve the quality of life for Bolivia's poorest citizens. Both of these alliances are largely consistent with anti-imperialism ideologies so common on the left. It is however, difficult to comply fully with the demands of each of these constituencies simultaneously. The current dependence on natural resource extraction as a main source of income to fund welfare programs comes at the cost of territorial autonomy of several indigenous areas because mineral and natural gas rich areas are often found in rural areas where people tend to organize as indigenous. Similar to Ecuador, the co-optation of indigenous politics with socialists' ideology in Bolivia is a paradox because the capital requirements to fund egalitarian social programs is paid for by energy and mineral resources that degrade the environment and are often found on indigenous territory. In addition to showing a successful case of indigenous institutionalization, and exposing the paradoxical relationship between indigenous groups and the left, TIPNIS exposes the diversity of indigenous groups in relation to the environment.

The Isiboro Secure National Park (TIPNIS) was created in 1965 and was one of the earliest national parks in Bolivia. The Bolivian state allocated 1,200,000 hectares of lowland

Amazon rainforest in part to acknowledge the indigenous groups who lived there.⁶³ The park served the dual purpose of saving government money because they did not have to pay for infrastructure in the park, and allowing isolated groups to maintain their more traditional lifestyles. The park did not have any financial investment from the rest of the state in terms of physical infrastructure, health programs, or other government services.⁶⁴ In 1990, TIPNIS was officially recognized as both a national park and indigenous territory after the March for Territory and Dignity, where residents marched to La Paz demanding territorial rights. Since then the park has been co-managed by between the National Protected Areas Agency (SERNAP) and the TIPNIS authorities. Approximately 63 Mojenos-Trinitario, Chimane and Yuracare communities live in various settlements mostly in the northern part of the territory along the rivers Secure, Isiboro and Ichoa that fall under the jurisdiction of TIPNIS.⁶⁵ The southern section of the territory is additionally broken up into two governing authorities within the jurisdiction of SERNAP, and there are two sub-sections called TIPNIS Subcentral and Secure Subcentral each with 37 and 14 communities respectively. The southern territory has groups from Quechua and Aymara decent who have been migrating into the park to establish coca farms for past thirty years.⁶⁶

The road project at the heart of the political controversy in TIPNIS began in 2010 in an effort to connect the small town of Villa Tunari to San Ignacio de Moxos running through the middle of the park. The goal of the project is to connect the departments of Cochabama to

⁶³ *Bolivia: Informe sobre el Sistema Nacional De Areas Protegidas.*, Informe país SERNAP (2007)

⁶⁴ https://ac-els-cdn-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/S2214790X16301794/1-s2.0-S2214790X16301794-main.pdf?_tid=d36c63ac-0e8f-11e8-ad6b-00000aabb0f02&acdnt=1518287332_148168bcb144caf6a27245c0fb45bb7c

⁶⁵ <https://www.oopp.gob.bo/>

⁶⁶ Saavedra, O., 2011. Nota de prensa: Marcha Indígena Por El Tipnis: Tensión Creativa O Contradicción De Clase? CEDLA, pp. 1–2.

Beni.⁶⁷ By connecting two major cities through the park, the Bolivian government is both bringing national political presence into a territory that is governed independently and helping to create physical infrastructure that would assist in hydrocarbon extraction. The road was routed past several hydrocarbon reserves already authorized for extraction under previous government contracts. The project was originally financed by the Brazilian Development Bank as part of a larger Latin American development project trying to increase efficiency of primary commodities extraction and exportation through funding infrastructure.⁶⁸

TIPNIS Subcentral immediately came to a consensus agreement in opposition despite President Evo Morales' claim that NGOs were the main culprit behind the movement against the development project.⁶⁹ Ironically, Evo Morales strengthened indigenous territorial rights originally solidified in 1990, with the 2009 constitution. TIPNIS Subcentral is actually evoking the statute in the Bolivian constitution "to self-determination and territoriality, to create and administer their own systems, means, and networks of communication, to the collective ownerships of land and territories and to live in a healthy environment, with appropriate management and exploitation of the ecosystems."⁷⁰ Opposition to the project spread across Bolivia as the overt contradiction between Morales' original message and his pursuit of the road project became apparent. To truly understand the seemingly paradoxical behavior of the Morales

⁶⁷ Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Servicios y Vivienda, 2012. Informe final del proceso de Consulta Previa, Libre e Informada a los Pueblos Moxeño-Trinitario, Yuracaré y Chimán del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure (TIPNIS). Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia

⁶⁸ Canessa A. 2015. El pasado en el presente: explorando historias indígenas en Bolivia. *Revista Española de Antropología Americana*. 44(1):

⁶⁹ Paz, S., 2012. In: Bautista, R., Chavez, M., Chavez, P., Paz, S., Prada, R., Tapia, L.(Eds.), *El Conflict Del Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS) Y Sus Consecuencias Para El Estado Plurinacional De Bolivia. La Victoria del TIPNIS Autdeterminacion.*

⁷⁰ Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Constitution of 2009

regime in promoting the TIPNIS road project when there are also overt policies aimed at protecting the environment, it is necessary to trace the political history of the MAS party.

Prior to 1985, Bolivia had a number of economic policies under import substitution industrialization prioritizing domestic production over foreign production so the country could build a base of industrialized infrastructure. Under the leftist coalition called Democratic Popular Unity (UDP), Bolivia created a number of protections such as higher taxation on imports that discouraged foreign markets to enter in the Bolivian market.⁷¹ The policy came after a post-colonial societal structure that relied heavily on exporting a few raw materials and imported finished products. As the economic crisis of the 1980s worsened, a number of countries in the region, including Bolivia faced hyperinflation and a sudden drop in the price of commodities. Finally, in 1985 the UDP fell apart and elections were held. The subsequent government led by Paz Estenssoro followed Chile's model of opening up markets which occurred during the Augusto Pinochet regime. In order to be suitable for international financial institutions, the Bolivians had to remove barriers to import foreign products and implement austerity measures drafted by Harvard University Students under Jeffery Sachs.⁷² As opposed to a slower transition to neoliberalism as in the case of Costa Rica, Bolivia faced *Shock Therapy*, an abrupt transition to an internationally integrated economy. Inflation rates dropped from 8,170% to 9% within a year, but 35,000 factory workers and 20,000 miners lost their jobs.⁷³ This model had detrimental effects for the livelihoods of citizens within Bolivia because their domestically protected production could not compete with products that had already been competing in international markets. The national mining corporation (COMIBOL) for example closed leading to dispersed

⁷¹ COHA. *A Brief Recent History of Bolivia and the Rise of President Morales*. COHA. <http://www.coha.org/a-brief-recent-history-of-bolivia-and-the-rise-of-president-morales/>

⁷² *Ibid.* COHA

⁷³ *Ibid.* COHA

unemployment throughout the country as opposed to urban centers.⁷⁴ The sudden economic shift had number of implications that help explain the rise of MAS as a socialist-indigenous coalition that has since become the dominant political party in the current Bolivian political system.

First there was a huge migration to cities, which caused a dramatic growth of urban population and poverty rates. The largest cities in the country, La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz took many displaced mine workers and farmers. This process was crucial for bringing together groups of people with strong indigenous identity with the proletariat organization of the city. A shared history of marginalization created a natural alliance and strong political connections between the urban left and indigenous groups that were displaced following the economic reforms. With the organizational skills of the urban working class through the Izquierda Unidad (IU) party coinciding with a growing indigenous presences created a sense of “Indigenous nationalism” that previously did not have as wide spread of a following.⁷⁵ As a result of the 1985 neoliberal reforms a number of indigenous leaders from the coca industry who had close ties with the growing urban indigenous population aligned with the IU in Cochabamba. The IU vote share increased from 2% in 1985 to 33% in 1989 in Cochabamba.⁷⁶ The elections in Cochabamba marked the beginning what would be Bolivia’s hegemonic MAS party because it showed the power of an alliance between the urban left and indigenous groups.

Indigenous nationalism also increased in the Chapare region as more indigenous people chose to work on coca farms. The coca industry attracted a large proportion of unemployed

⁷⁴ Albro R. 2006. The Culture of Democracy and Bolivia’s Indigenous Movements. *Critique of Anthropology*. 26(4):387–410

⁷⁵ COHA. *A Brief Recent History of Bolivia and the Rise of President Morales*. COHA. <http://www.coha.org/a-brief-recent-history-of-bolivia-and-the-rise-of-president-morales/>

⁷⁶ Healy, 1991 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/166043.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:bc558e859ada414aeb6a2e27610f07ec>

campesinos because it provided fairly high wages and produced a highly sought after product. The coca leaf was particularly important for the creation of the MAS party because it provided a steady source of income for the political base of unionized coca farmers, indigenous campesinos, and displaced workers. Coca is critical for the production of cocaine, which became extremely prominent during 1980s. In addition to its use for cocaine, the coca leaf is an extremely important cultural domestic commodity. For those who performed physically demanding jobs at high altitudes, coca helped alleviate the symptoms of mild altitude sickness which is extremely common for workers in Bolivia's highlands. The U.S. proclaimed a 'War on Drugs' around the same time coca became an increasingly important domestically produced commodity for Bolivians. The U.S. targeted suppliers of coca leaves in Bolivia in addition to cartels in Columbia instead of addressing exclusively the demand within the U.S.⁷⁷ The increased salience of coca both culturally and economically made the suppression of coca by the U.S. a particularly sensitive matter for most Bolivians. Cocaleros and most of the Bolivian public alike perceived the attack on coca as an attack on their sovereignty and an attack on indigenous cultural traditions by the U.S.

The creation of the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (ASP) by top Cocaleros marked the next big step in the creation of the MAS party. In 1995 the ASP political party formed from the coca farming union, the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB). Shortly after the 1994 "March for Life" which organized a large group to march from Chapare to La Paz, the ASP championed indigenous rights as well as advocated for policies supporting the coca industry. Also in 1994 the Popular Participation Law strengthened the role of municipalities, causing local industries like coca production in Chapare more power.

⁷⁷ Indigenous in the Plural

The ASP along with the IU both capitalized on the growing anti-neo-colonial sentiment reaching the wider public in Bolivia by identifying the foreign economic meddling under the Washington Consensus as the causal mechanism for the low standards of living for the urban poor and the lack of autonomy felt by indigenous groups. They argued that structural adjustment leading to neoliberal policies gave preferential treatment to foreign investors and left the majority of the Bolivian population behind.

The IU and ASP parties formed an electoral alliance bridging the gap between indigenous and class divides in Bolivia's opposition movement. This strategy was effective in some regions but still had not consolidated the support it needed. In 1997, the IU-ASP coalition only won 4% of the national vote but 17.5% of the vote in Cochabamba. Additionally, the party won 6 members to the national congress⁷⁸ The ASP and the IU lacked the charismatic leadership to effectively co-opt the indigenous and class based political struggle. One leader, Evo Morales, won 62% of the vote in the Chapare region establishing himself as a promising young star for the future of Bolivian politics. Morales appeared to be the charismatic leader the IU-ASP needed but soon after his electoral win in the Chapare region, Morales broke from the group because of a political disputes between CSUTCB that formed the ASP. Morales wanted to stay loyal to the Cocalero Union but also wanted to use the same strategies of the ASP. Morales created his own party borrowing the tactics of the IU-ASP union and the name MAS from a smaller, more obscure party.⁷⁹ Morales' break from the IU-ASP allowed him to focus more on the newfound indigenous identification of the country's population and the coca farming industry without

⁷⁸ McKee, C. *The Campaign for an Instrumento Político: The Latest Developments in the Indigenous Movement in Bolivia*. Unpublished paper presented at the Society for Latin American Studies Postgraduates in Latin American Studies, Hull, England, 4-5 December

⁷⁹ Albro R. 2006. The Culture of Democracy and Bolivia's Indigenous Movements. *Critique of Anthropology*. 26(4):387-410440

dealing with the conflicting personalities in the IU-ASP. The majority of Bolivia's population has indigenous roots but many did not formerly identify as indigenous. By 1999, Evo Morales and the MAS party solidified its place in the national political arena as a result of social movement politics. MAS organized blockades and marches which were consistently implemented to great effect during the Water Wars of 2001 and in other national protests.⁸⁰

Evo Morales often would say 'The MAS represents social movements, and is a political instrument of liberation. It is not the creation of politólogos, nor of political analysts, academics or politicians. It is born from a congress of peasants.'⁸¹ The spirit of social protest emerged during the Water War of 2000 and the Gas war of 2003. In 1999, President Hugo Banzer granted Cochabamba's water utilities to a U.S. based company called Bechtel after pressure from international lenders to privatize more of Bolivia's industry. Water prices increased up to 200% leading to social resistance from the Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life. The group protested with marches, strikes and roadblocks trying to create as much social upheaval as possible so they could have reasonable access to water. President Banzer Ordered 1,200 military personnel to regain control of the city where hundreds were injured and one was killed. As a response 100,000 citizens, including factory workers, farmers, Cocaleros, peasants, unionists, miners, students, and others converged on the city's central plaza where the government realized it had to change the policy it had regarding the privatization of water.⁸²

In September and October of 2003, protests in the suburb of El Alto resisted a pipeline exporting natural gas to Chile. In October government forces under Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada

⁸⁰ *Ibid. Albro, Robert*

⁸¹ *Ibid. Albro, Robert*

⁸² COHA. *A Brief Recent History of Bolivia and the Rise of President Morales*. COHA. <http://www.coha.org/a-brief-recent-history-of-bolivia-and-the-rise-of-president-morales/>

killed over 60 protesters causing a large scale movement in which 1000 people conducted a series of hunger strikes in solidarity with indigenous protesters. Similar to the intervention over Coca production by the U.S. and the privatization of water utilities due to the international lenders, the pipeline was seen as the last straw for much of the country's population. Sanchez de Lozada resigned in March leaving the country in the hands of the vice president Carlos Mesa. Although protests over the pipeline was critical for creating structural political change, natural gas maintained a critical part in the economy.

Once Morales and MAS won the presidency in 2005, they were given the opportunity to implement the 'multiethnic and pluri-cultural' democracy that he advocated for as the MAS grew in prominence. In 2009, Morales' constitution passed through congress Indigenous peoples are to be recognized politically as opposed to assimilated into the traditional nation-state model. Several political parties including MAS meet to have an organized reaction to the public killings and determined that the roadblocks and nationwide strikes would continue indefinitely.⁸³ The protest were enough to oust President Sanchez de Lozada from power ushering a demand for structural reform. The increasing and sustained protest is responsible for creating a new governmental structure that is particularly responsive to social protests.⁸⁴ After two more years of social protests, Carlos Mesa, Lozada's vice president and successor, also resigned creating the need for elections in 2005.


Although Morales' presidential win in 2005 marks a significant turning point for the MAS party and Bolivian politics toward a government more aligned with social movements, it was not the first step MAS took toward institutionalization. In 2002 after a close electoral loss,

⁸³ <https://www.counterpunch.org/2003/09/29/bolivia-s-gas-war/>

⁸⁴ COHA. *A Brief Recent History of Bolivia and the Rise of President Morales*. COHA. <http://www.coha.org/a-brief-recent-history-of-bolivia-and-the-rise-of-president-morales/>


Morales began to advocate for some reform policies from within the formal political system. For example Morales took a conciliatory position to the administration of Carlos Mesa, and supported many of Mesa's moderate proposals.⁸⁵ Morales distanced himself from his various leadership positions in various revolutionary movements and ceded his power to his former rival, Felipe Quispe so he could channel social movement energy into traditional political mobilization. As Morales planned for the 2005 presidential election, he began to focus his attention on acquiescing support from the Bolivian middle class because he knew that he had already solidified the indigenous voting base. In the 2005 election there was an 85% voter turnout, the highest up until that point, and Morales won 53.7% of the electorate.⁸⁶

Evo Morales undeniably moved toward some more moderate policies in order to secure his position and appease some opposition forces on the right but still quickly nationalized the



⁸⁵ Coha

⁸⁶ *Ibid. coha*



natural gas industry in 2006. By nationalizing natural gas, Morales increased the size and spending power of his government. Morales attempted to implement policies to stimulate economic growth through Keynesian style government spending on social programs, infrastructure projects, investment into domestic production, and multi-sectoral investment.⁸⁷ This strategy effectively coincided with the rhetoric promoting Bolivian economic autonomy in the face of years of colonial and post-colonial exploitation from foreign powers. Spending on social programs addressing poverty, sanitation, education and pension spending increased 45% in real terms but decreased as a proportion of the GDP.⁸⁸ Additionally, Bolivia under the Morales government began planning for price fluctuation in natural resources by increasing the national reserve. Increasing national reserves was not just good economic planning, it was absolutely essential Bolivia's survival and, by extension, the survival of the MAS party. Venezuela's descent into economic disaster and social turmoil provided a stark example of the results when an oil producing country mismanaged their finances.

⁸⁷ Johnston J, Lefebvre S. *Bolivia's Economy Under Evo in 10 Graphs*. CEPR. <http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/bolivias-economy-under-evo-in-10-graphs>

⁸⁸ Ibid. Johnston

Although the economic changes under Morales are significant, the most dramatic change Morales implemented was the 2009 constitutional reform which called for a “Pluri-national” state. The constitution specifies in Article 1

“Bolivia is constituted as a Unitary Social State of Pluri-National Communitarian Law (Estado Unitario Social de Derecho Plurinacional Comunitario) that is free, independent, sovereign, democratic, inter-cultural, decentralized and with autonomies. Bolivia is founded on plurality and on political, economic, juridical, cultural and linguistic pluralism in the integration process of the country.”⁸⁹

The idea of plurinationality in terms of cultural representation in Bolivia is not inherently inconsistent with the economic centralization pursued under the MAS regime. However, the idea of decentralization and autonomy based on separate ethnic nationalities is inconsistent with the funding model the central government in Bolivia relies on. Unlimited access to the country’s natural resources such as natural gas and mining requires a hierarchical system of governance as opposed to a decentralized system of regions all equally responsible for the well-being of the collective state. In other words, equal regional autonomy and resource extraction led by one actor of a non-consenting party are mutually exclusive ideas. A counter argument to this idea is that a plurinational state does not explicitly mean equal political control but rather more autonomy for particular territories than the traditional Westphalian state model. This interpretation proves false when in Article 2, which guaranteed the right to autonomy, self-government, their culture, recognition of their institutions, and consolidation of their territorial entities within the framework of the unity of the state.⁹⁰ Later, in Article 302, the constitution goes on to specify that enterprises of industrialization, distribution and commercialization of Hydrocarbons in

Johnston J, Lefebvre S. *Bolivia's Economy Under Evo in 10 Graphs*. CEPR. <http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/bolivas-economy-under-evo-in-10-graphs>

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* Johnston

municipal territory are under the exclusive authority of the municipalities in which those resources are found.⁹¹

The next landmark piece of legislation that relates to the TIPNIS struggle is Ley 071 also known as the Law of the Rights Mother Earth was passed in December 2010. The simple 10 article law was designed to promote environmentalism as a leading tenet under the Morales regime. The law seeks to reaffirm the rights of “Mother Earth” as an obligation of the Plurinational state of Bolivia. Chapter 3 of the law lists the right to life, diversity of life, water, clean air, equilibrium, restauration and to live free of contamination.⁹² These principles are again contradictory to the inevitable dangers associated with both mineral extraction and natural gas extraction. The creation of this law in addition to the environmental stipulations in the 2009 constitution coinciding with increased reliance on extractive practices that degrade the environment are puzzling. This is particularly confusing when we consider Morales leading role in social movements prior to his tenure as president. In order to understand how Morales’ regime continues to justify his sponsorship of the TIPNIS road project, one must look at the arguments on both sides of the TIPNIS road project to see how Morales is rationalizing, or ignoring his previous stances.

The immediate reaction to news of the TIPNIS road project in 2010 was protests by the majority of groups within the territory. The critique of the project was not an overall rejection of development in the region or a rejection of hydrocarbons in a general sense, but instead groups mobilized on the basis that their constitutional indigenous rights for territorial autonomy were denied.⁹³ Indigenous groups were upset that the state did not consult with them at all prior to

⁹¹ *Ibid* Johnston

⁹² Ley 071, Derechos de la Madre Tierra, December 21, 2010., Bolivia

⁹³ *Ibid*. Ley 071

announcing and beginning the road. Evo Morales was setting the precedent that indigenous territorial autonomy was secondary to the federal government's priorities just one year after the new constitution. There was no consultation with indigenous groups over where or how to carry out the road project. The main consideration of the Morales government was that they would adhere to the conditions specified by the Brazilian Development Bank and the Organization of American States (OAS) that began funding the project from its inception in 2008.⁹⁴

In 2011, after Morales insisted that the project would be constructed despite protest, 1000 TIPNIS residents marched for 65 days from their territory to La Paz. The marchers endured drastic changes in weather and altitude changes, as well as food and water shortages, road blocks and violent repression from the police over their 360 mile journey.⁹⁵ After 70 protesters were wounded, the government faced widespread condemnation from within municipality governments. Civic strikes ensued and two government ministers resigned. This social unrest led to a few short term changes in which Morales apologized on behalf of the police and he signed a law banning construction of the TIPNIS highway and named the reserve an "untouchable" zone.⁹⁶

The status of TIPNIS as untouchable led to a series of policies by the federal government that prohibited sustainable development activities such as ecotourism which was a main source of income for many of the residents within the park. A new coalition of communities consisting of groups from the southern TIPNIS region who are also connected the coca economy in Cochabamba began a counter march to La Paz demanding that the road be built. Morales responded to the new protests in February 2012 by creating a consultation process (*consulta*) to

⁹⁴ Achtenberg E. Contested Development: The Geopolitics of Bolivia's TIPNIS Conflict. *NACALA*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* Achtenberg E

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* Achtenberg E

deal with the conflict within the park. The goal of the consultation was to address the problem of having mandated the TIPNIS road project without consulting the communities to begin with, and having revoked the road project without consultation to the southern communities of TIPNIS. The *consulta* reported 80% of TIPNIS communities supported the project while three opposed and 11 communities declined to participate.⁹⁷ These results have been challenged by the Catholic Church and human rights organizations, which argued that the government manipulated the communities involved by underrepresenting the environmental impact of the road and overstating the economic benefits for those communities. Both the Church and human rights groups sponsored an independent commission which found that 30 of 35 communities were in fact opposed to the project and that the government manipulated groups saying they would provide additional financial support to their communities if they supported the project.

The TIPNIS communities opposing the project argue that there would be little to no economic impact for communities and only environmental degradation. The planned road was over 50 km from the majority of TIPNIS communities which meant that the communities themselves could not use the road without exerting serious effort. They still would face the environmental risk to waterways and local agriculture inherent to hydrocarbon exploration and extraction. Some communities argue the road should be more accommodating for their communities while others argue any development of the road is counter to the constitutional commitment to *Vivir Bien* model. That model is one in which a small local and self-sustained community development model can live independently of the larger state model. One leader

⁹⁷ Ángel Guarachi, “En el TIPNIS 55 comunidades apoyan vía por el parque; el Gobierno anuncia construir una carretera ecológica,” *La Razón* (La Paz, Bolivia), December 7, 2012, available at la-razon.com.

pointed out that indigenous roots and personal commitment to indigenous autonomy are not necessarily always aligned.


“The TIPNIS is the heart of everyone in Bolivia but for me it is my homeland and my world because it is the world where we live, where we enjoy, where we have fun, where we live together, where we suffer, where we are ill, where we can move freely, no? and where we live in harmony, between humans and nature, with the insects, fish, animals and amphibians,... We live together in this area for this reason, it is my world, and means the future existence of my indigenous community.”⁹⁸

Despite internal conflict within the region, the untouchable status of the TIPNIS region remained in place in theoretical terms until August 2015 when Morales introduced a new law reinstituting the road project. Morales argued that the road is essential for improving education and health infrastructure to the region. In 2013, when Morales was running for a second term in office, he mentioned that the road would be on hold until extreme poverty was addressed in the region.⁹⁹ Resistance to the new law inspired a new opposition which combined traditional allies such as the Catholic Church, environmental NGOs, human rights’ groups, as well as new allies such as the national trade union federation called the Bolivian Workers Central (COB). The COB had once supported the road but have since changed positions after conflict with the MAS party. The southern region of TIPNIS is still in support of the road since their economy is intrinsically connected to the Cocaleros of Cochabamba. Morales has reintroduced this project in preparation for elections in 2019 seeking to realign himself with the Cocalero farmers from Cochabamba and meat producers of the Beni region. These regions are growing in importance because of population increase and the ideology is beginning to be pro-development in those regions.

⁹⁸ TIPNIS leader 1 interview 2013.

⁹⁹ Achtenberg E. Contested Development: The Geopolitics of Bolivia's TIPNIS Conflict. *NACALA*

The institutionalization of indigenous groups in the case of Bolivia is analogous with the overarching question that every indigenous community must face: How do we want to live? As the MAS has developed from a social movement party to the hegemonic political party in Bolivian politics, it has confirmed its commitment to both a Westphalia state model and an integrated socialist economy of the modern world. The debate surround the TIPNIS road project presents an interesting contraction in the MAS party's dual commitment to the indigenous autonomy and to its socialist state model. The institutionalization of MAS as the indigenous social movement party to the subject of widespread indigenous protest exposes the ideological tension within the party. Still, having widespread commitment to indigenous autonomy has given protesters a legal framework in which they can argue their claims. The Law of the Rights of Mother Earth and the 2009 Constitution have provided a framework that the majority of the communities in TIPNIS needed to argue their case. The most effective mobilizations in Bolivia on behalf of environmentalism have been organized, sustained and evoked a sense of indigenous identity in conjunction with conservation. Although the institutionalization of MAS as an indigenous movement accentuates ideological conflicts between socialism and pluri-nationalism, it still presents one of the most successful environmental cases in the three countries discussed.



Summary Table

	La Oroya, Peru	Oriente Region, Ecuador	TIPNIS, Bolivia
Presence of Indigenous Identity	Yes	Yes	Yes
National Indigenous Movement	No	Yes	Yes
Indigenous Party Formation	No	Yes	Yes
Indigenous Inspired Environmental Policy	No	Yes	Yes
Enforcement of Policy	No	No	Temporary

Analysis and Conclusions

Indigenous social movements in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia have undergone several waves of political importance throughout the twentieth century until today. After the surge of neoliberalism in Latin America had subsided by the early 2000s, coalitions between traditional leftist parties and indigenous groups seized their opportunities to gain control of their respective governments. With Toledo's short lived green liberalism in Peru, Correa in Ecuador and Morales in Bolivia, each of these saw a major shift in the importance of their indigenous electorates. Each of the three countries has a high indigenous population, but also a dominant extractive industry that has serious consequences for the environment and public health of indigenous peoples. These three countries have long histories of social movements and street level political activism that have been fundamental to how democracy in these countries now function. These three countries have populations that articulate their indigenous identity to mobilize in drastically different ways. Why then, are there still mostly negative results for environmental outcomes when indigenous organizations have reached high levels of electoral and institutional success in coalition governments with the left in Bolivia and Ecuador? The case of Peru is fairly straight

forward because indigenous groups simply did not organize at a national level. To be clear, parties on the left are the logical choice for indigenous groups to align with given the shared historical marginalization and their shared critique of conservative governments. National organization of indigenous groups is critical for effectively mobilizing and advocating for environmental policy but once indigenous groups align with parties on the left that rely on extractive practices to fund social programs, environmental outcomes become less certain.

The cases selected were the most likely to succeed at reaching a policy protecting a particular area and the enforcement of that law. The cases were highly politicized due to extreme environmental degradation causing community wide public health problems and by an important indigenous groups. All three cases actually had one or more laws protecting environment but faced varying challenges with enforcement. In La Oroya, the law requiring higher environmental standards in terms of air and water pollution came about as a result of conditionality from a World Bank loan and was not enforced until 2007. Ecuador passed its landmark environmental protection law in 1999 by using traditional protests techniques organized by CONAIE.

The case of TIPNIS came after Bolivia saw constitutional reform and the law of the rights of mother earth that called for better environmental standards and gave indigenous groups the right to territorial autonomy. This made TIPNIS one of the most contentious environmental fights in Latin America in recent history. All of these cases have attracted the attention of international institutions, international NGOs, and widespread domestic support making it more likely these cases will result in success. Evaluating the variation in three most likely cases to succeed is crucial because the majority of political and legal battles over the environment in this region

have negative results. The most detectable variations are detectable in the most likely cases of success because most other cases have little to no effect at all.

Another important criteria for case selection was that indigenous identification is similar in all three cases but indigenous organization varies. The appeal to indigenous identity nationally is obvious in all three of these countries. Alejandro Toledo used his identity as indigenous to win the presidency despite doing nothing for indigenous groups. Toledo's could appeal to descriptive representation without having to be accountable to a national indigenous institution that could influence a large electorate so it is no surprise that there were no substantive environmental changes during his presidency. Ecuador had the CONAIE and later the Pachakutik advocating on behalf indigenous interests at the national level but these groups were divided on policy and spread too thin to effectively move policy in the Correa government. CONAIE and Pachakutik proved to motivate policy and advocate on behalf of the environment before the Correa's progressive government came to power. When Correa was in power, the Pachakutik did not have as much sway in his national political agenda because the indigenous movement fragmented. Finally, the MAS party intertwined socialism and indigenous politics so tightly that Morales was guaranteed to break the laws that he had implemented. Morales designed the new 2009 constitution and the Law for the Rights of Mother Earth that both independently established that indigenous communities would have autonomy over their land and that government would prioritize the environmental. The MAS began as a unified indigenous movement but later opposition to the TIPNIS road project showed that MAS could not represent all indigenous people. This is in stark contrast to the ad hoc campesinos protest in Peru, and the fragmented indigenous groups in Ecuador.

In order for indigenous voices to be heard in a larger democratic society, groups must band together in one unified bloc. The paradoxical relationship between plurinationality and unified representation provides a continuous tension for indigenous politics. This paradox is apparent in both Ecuador and Bolivia where national coalitions of indigenous groups and struggled to come to a consensus on environmental policy. Cultural variation between indigenous groups and regional preferences are the main ways in which indigenous groups vary. In all three countries there is a sharp cultural contrast between Andean indigenous people who descend from Quechua, Aymara or Kichwa and those who descend from the amazon where there are hundreds of distinct groups with their own cultural practices. Both Ecuador and Bolivia formed indigenous groups based on regional interests in addition to national interests. In Ecuador, regional interest took precedence over national politics and support for Pachakutik quickly diminished. In Bolivia, splits within the north and south of TIPNIS over what to do with the road finally revealed the ways in which regional loyalties play out. Southern groups with ties to Cocalero farmers tended to favor the road because they believe there is more likely to be economic growth in their region, whereas groups in the north are likely to see environmental degradation from the extraction of hydrocarbons. In La Oroya, mobilization was not centered around the constructed connection of indigeneity and conservation, but instead around the effects of policy. People would mobilize because their children are sick, or because they are afraid of losing their job at the smelter instead of out of collective indigenous comradery. In all of these cases, traditional political means were not initially sufficient and people decided to mobilize through protest.

Indigenous social movements have traditionally affiliated with the left, because the left is uncomfortable with the extant at which inequity persists generally in society. Indigenous groups in Latin America have been at the lowest part of the historical social hierarchy. There are

generation of indigenous people who have felt left out and denied autonomy from colonization until the present day. In the past few decades in Peru, the Sendero Luminoso had done lasting damage to the left when they assassinated several leaders that might pose as an alternative. This brutality from the Sendero Luminoso also made much of the more moderate Peruvian population skeptical of political parties on the left. In Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous groups have aligned with varying levels of support for the left. In Ecuador, Luis Macas, denied joining Correa's presidential ticket as vice president but ended up endorsing Correa after the Pachakutik lost in the first round. In Bolivia, the MAS party is hegemonic in its control over most indigenous voters, Cocalero constituents, and the urban working class. This unchallenged control has led Morales and the MAS party to achieve relatively radical and sometimes contradictory policy goals.

The alignment between indigenous groups and the left comes largely in contrast to neoliberal policies imposed by conservatives and the Washington Consensus. In Peru, the reaction to the Fujimori government led to Alejandro Toledo who was further left than Fujimori and Alan Garcia. This, however, was not an enduring change and right wing politics remains largely more organized and consistent than the left in Peru. Correa's electoral win in Ecuador marked a serious win for the left that ushered in a series of progressive reforms that have improved the livelihood of many Ecuadorians. This progressive base is in spite of Pachakutik that has seen very little electoral success. As previously mentioned the Bolivian left has strongly aligned with indigenous groups and have been explicit in their contempt for Neoliberalism. This is because of the severe shock therapy tactics implemented in the 1980s as well as the War on Drugs that targeted Coca producers in Bolivia. Another key aspect that both the left and

indigenous groups want is a more equitable land distribution often sought after through Agrarian reform.

The common interests of making coalitions between indigenous groups and the left are a particularly potent combination when mobilized through social movements. Both CONAIE and MAS were extremely effective when they advocated for policies using disruptive political strategies before institutionalization. Social movements are extremely effective in preventing policy outcomes like building a pipeline, or stopping the privatization of water, but it is much more difficult to get a large group of people to agree on a policy solution. Internal divisions and policy preferences between indigenous groups become more apparent when social movements institutionalize because groups must form and solidify policy goals that effect their communities in different ways. This is largely consistent with Piven and Cloward's theory that once movements institutionalize they become less effect than they were when they could use more radical forms of demonstration. The tension within groups became most apparently in the case of MAS and Bolivia. Social movements in Bolivia organized thousands of people into cities during its protests, but once Morales had to decide between creating a source of potential revenue to fund social programs and respecting indigenous autonomy and maintaining preference for environment conservation. He first prioritized building extractive infrastructure until he saw too much opposition via social movement. Later, Morales began implementing the project again when it became more politically feasible. These disagreements do not come up when groups are simply mobilizing to stop some policy and are not actually in a position of power.

The role of institutionalization has produced somewhat mixed results for Ecuador and Bolivia. When Ecuador's indigenous movement created Pachakutik, it lost power because the

split from CONAIE accentuated tactical disagreements about what is the best for the countries wildly diverse indigenous population. Bolivia's institutionalization was largely successful in terms of creating real policy changes but the enforcement of those policies put other priorities of the MAS party at risk. Still, the TIPNIS road was halted on the basis of constitutional statutes created by the MAS party. Creating those laws is undeniably progress although it falls short of a catch all solution to maintaining indigenous autonomy and protection of the environment.

The conflicting interests between indigenous and groups on the left reflects fundamental questions about the ways that democracy should function when the needs and desires of particular groups of people vary so profoundly. Indigenous groups must advocate collectively to have power but, in doing so, groups sacrifice particular aspects of their more specific regional goals. These problems are inherent to any political organization but the tradeoffs are particularly sharp because of the radically different ways in which indigenous groups live. Do indigenous groups have the responsibility to sacrifice sections of their territory for the well-being of people who live in different regions of the country? Do indigenous people have an obligation to the traditions of their particular group? How do indigenous groups want to interact with modernity politically and culturally? These questions are fundamental in the ways in which communities organize and represent themselves in the modern world. In addition to questions of related to ethnic representation, it is also important to consider the ways in which environmental movements manifest, and mobilize for their causes, especially when the consequences of particular projects are confined to groups with substantially less political power than those benefiting from extractive projects.

Bibliography:

A champion of indigenous rights—and of state control of the economy. *The Economist* 14. Dec. 2005

Achtenberg E. Contested Development: The Geopolitics of Bolivia's TIPNIS Conflict. *NACALA*

Acosta, Alberto “La Maldición de la Abundancia” (Quito, Ecuador: Abya Yala, 2009), 75

Adeola F. Environmental Injustice and Human Rights Abuse: The States, MNCs, and Repression of Minority Groups in the World System. *Research in Human Ecology*

Albro R. 2006. The Culture of Democracy and Bolivia’s Indigenous Movements. *Critique of Anthropology*. 26(4):387–410

Barrett, Paul M. 2014. *Law of the Jungle: The \$19 Billion Legal Battle Over Oil in the Rain*
Becker, D. (2014). *The New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency. Mining, Class, and Power in Revolutionary Peru*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Retrieved 27 Jan. 2018, from <https://www-degruyter-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/product/453057>

Black, John, Nigar Hashimzade, and Gareth Myles. 2017. *Oxford Dictionary of Economics*. Oxford University Press.

Bolivia: Informe sobre el Sistema Nacional De Areas Protegidas., Informe país SERNAP (2007

Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Constitution of 2009

CASE OF THE COMMUNITY OF LA OROYA, PERU. AIDA: Protecting our Right to a Healthy Environment . <http://www.aida-americas.org/sites/default/files/La%20Oroya%20Fact%20Sheet%20ENG%2014-02-12.pdf>

Canessa A. 2015. El pasado en el presente: explorando historias indígenas en Bolivia. *Revista Española de Antropología Americana*. 44(1):

Forest and the Lawyer Who'd Stop at Nothing to Win. New York: Crown Publishers.

Diversos, artículos. 1970. “Contaminacion en la Oroya - Perú.” *Centromín y Doe Run en desacuerdo sobre descontaminación de La Oroya*.

<http://oroyaperu.blogspot.com/2007/12/centromn-y-doe-run-en-desacuerdo-sobre.html> (January 29, 2018).

Eaton K. 2007. Backlash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a Reaction against Indigenous Mobilization. *Politics & Society*. 35(1):71–102

Edwin, Joeseeph. “Toxic Threat in Ecuador Rainforest.” *New Straits Times*.

“Endgame in Ecuador.” *Chevron in Ecuador: A Timeline of Events*.

https://www.eenews.net/special_reports/ecuador/timeline (February 12, 2018).

Gillis, Carly. “Ecuador vs Texaco-Chevron: A Brief History.” *Counterspill.org*

- Graham, Carol. 1993. "Economic Austerity and the Peruvian Crisis: The Social Cost of Autocracy." *SAIS Review* 13(1): 45–60.
- Hanratty, Dennis Michael. "Ecuador: A Country Study." <https://www.loc.gov/item/91009494/>.
- Johnston J, Lefebvre S. *Bolivia's Economy Under Evo in 10 Graphs*. CEPR. <http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/bolivias-economy-under-evo-in-10-graphs>
- Larson B, Madrid R, Mayorga RA, Varat J. 2008. Bolivia: Social Movements, Populism, and Democracy. *Woodrow Wilson Center Update on the Americas*
- "Laws & Regulations." *Ecuador | Forest Legality*. <http://www.forestlegality.org/risk-tool/country/ecuador> (February 12, 2018).
- Ley 071, Derechos de la Madre Tierra, December 21, 2010., Bolivia
- Lucero JA. The Paradoxes of Indigenous Politics. *American Quarterly*
- Malone, Robert. 2013. "In Pictures: World's Dirtiest Cities." *Forbes*. https://www.forbes.com/2007/03/21/worlds-dirtiest-cities-biz-logistics-cx_rm_0321dirtiest_slide_6.html#2a6d9e8863fc (January 29, 2018).
- Maybury-Lewis, D. (2005, Spring). DEFINING INDIGENOUS. *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, 29, 11.
- McFaddenb, Heather Faith. 2012. ProQuest "Constructing Indigenous Identity in Peru: From Indigenismo to Toursim." <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1282648992?pq-origsite=summon>
- Mijeski, Kenneth J., and Scott H. Beck. *Pachakutik and the rise and decline of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement*.
- Meyer, David S. 2015. *The politics of protest: social movements in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Orihuela, J. C. (2014). Las reglas ambientales del desarrollo económico: La regulación de la contaminación del aire generada por las fundidoras de chuquicamata y la Oroya/The environmental rules of economic development: Governing air pollution from smelters in chuquicamata and la oroya. *Economía*, 37(74), 213-246
- Pallares, Amalia. From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance: The Ecuadorian Andes in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Park, Chris C., and Michael Allaby. 2013. *A Dictionary of Environment and Conservation*. Oxford University Press.
- Paz, S., 2012. In: Bautista, R., Chavez, M., Chavez, P., Paz, S., Prada, R., Tapia, L.(Eds.), *El Conflict Del Territorio Indigena Paque Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS) Y Sus Consecuencias Para El Estado Plurinacional De Bolivia*. La Victoria del TIPNIS Autdeterminacion.
- Perreault T, Valdivia G. 2010. Hydrocarbons, popular protest and national imaginaries: Ecuador and Bolivia in comparative context. *Geoforum*. 41(5):689–99
- Picq M. 2014. Conflict Over Water Rights in Ecuador. *Aljazeera*, July 16
- Puente, Javier. 2017. "Making Peru's Sendero Luminoso: The Geography & Ecology of Civil War." *Age of Revolutions*. <https://ageofrevolutions.com/2017/03/29/making-perus-sendero-luminoso-the-geography-ecology-of-civil-war/> (January 29, 2018).

Puig SMI, Bastidas C. 2013. ¿Ha cambiado la protesta? : la coyuntura actual de movilizaciones en Bolivia y Ecuador. *Íconos - Revista de Ciencias Sociales*. (44):19

Shriar A. 2010. Destitution through “Development”: A Case Study of the Laka Laka Project in Cochabamba, Bolivia. *Sustainability*. 2(10):3239–57

“Texaco/Chevron lawsuits (Re Ecuador).” 2017. *Business & Human Rights Resource Centre*. <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador> (February 12, 2018).

The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. 2017. “Alberto Fujimori.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alberto-Fujimori> (January 29, 2018).

The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. 2017. “Alejandro Toledo.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alejandro-Toledo#ref1047906> (January 29, 2018).

“The World Factbook: PERU.” 2018. *Central Intelligence Agency*.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html> (January 29, 2018).

Van Cott, Donna Lee, *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press 2005

Wooten, Nicholas. *Heavy Metal Air Pollution in La Oroya, Peru*. Yale School of Forestry Environmental Studies Blog. <https://environment.yale.edu/blog/2016/02/heavy-metal-air-pollution-in-la-oroya-peru/>

Whitten, Norman E., Jr. 1976 *Sacha Runa: Ethnicity and Adaption of Ecuadorian Junle Quichua*. Urbana: University Illinois Press. (268)

Yerman MG. “*The Last Guardians*”: *The Indigenous Fight for Environmental Justice in Ecuador*. Truthout. <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/41889-the-last-guardians-the-indigenous-fight-for-environmental-justice-in-ecuador>